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PREFACE

The six-hundred year old Ottoman Empire came to an end after a defeat in the
Great War. A new Turkish nationalist movement emerged against the Allied
occupation in Asia Minor, largely made up of the Greek army, in 1919. Against the
Greek occupying forces, the Turks won their War of Independence and
established the Turkish Republic in 1923. This thesis examines U.S. foreign
relations with the new Turkish Republic between 1923 and 1927. As an
introduction, the first chapter will explain the relationship between the United
States and the Ottoman Empire through the end of the Great War. The second
chapter will focus on the 1922-23 treaty negotiations at Lausanne among Turkey,
the U.S., and the Allied Powers, mainly Britain, France and Italy. The last chapter
will study the American peoples’ reaction to the Lausanne Treaty until early 1927.
This thesis primarily depends on U.S. historical resources. Without distinction,
most of these resources define the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the
Republic of Turkey, as Turkey. In order to emphasize the difference, the thesis
refers to these countries as the Ottoman Empire until its end in 1923, unless in
direct quotation, and Turkey after 1923. The place names that were unanimously
spelled the same are not translated into their modern Turkish names - the modern
names did not become official until the Turkish adoption of the Latin alphabet in
1929.1 For instance, Smyrna, Constantinople and Angora are not translated into

1 This style is borrowed from Leland James Gordon’s American Relations with Turkey, 18301930: An Economic Interpretation. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932).
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Izmir, Istanbul or Ankara. Since the lesser known place names were spelled
differently from one resource to another, I chose to use their modern names. In
order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the Lausanne Treaty is sometimes referred
to as the Treaty, and the Department of State as the Department. Asia Minor and
Anatolia are used interchangeably to define the current Turkish land mass on the
Asian side of the country. The Near East in this work entails the entire Middle East
regardless whether certain lands in the Middle East were under Ottoman control
during the time of this study.
The third chapter largely explains how the Turks’ massacre and dislocation of
Armenians during and after the Great War affected American public opinion, and
as a result how the public wanted to influence U.S. foreign policy to help the
Armenians. The goal is to explore how the Armenian Genocide informed the
American people’s foreign policy choices. It is beyond the focus of this thesis to
narrate the Armenian Genocide or verify the accuracy of American people’s
knowledge about what actually happened. The thesis operates within common
American perceptions of Turks and the events that took place.

v
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ABSTRACT
OIL, HONOR AND RELIGION: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
TURKEY, 1923-1927
by
Aykut Kilinc
University of New Hampshire, September, 2007

The U.S. and Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and established
equal relations. In 1927, the U.S. Senate rejected this treaty. The Coolidge
administration, however, ignored the Senate’s rejection and activated the Treaty
shortly thereafter. This study was conducted to determine why the Lausanne
Treaty was rejected and how it survived. Under investigation were: the origins of
the U.S. foreign policy in the Near East, the Lausanne Conference negotiations,
and the American public’s reaction to the Lausanne Treaty. The Lausanne Treaty
was a result of a persistent U.S. Open Door foreign policy that was supported by
the new Turkish government. But an important segment of the American public
strenuously objected to this policy. Furthermore, the Turks’ massacre of its
Armenians minority population in large scales in 1914 and 1915 galvanized the
American public against the Turks. Despite these factors, the Lausanne Treaty
survived because the anti-Lausanne Treaty movement lost momentum due to
some people’s rejection of the prejudiced propaganda and a weary U.S. public
turning its attention elsewhere.

V II

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INTRODUCTION
After a long train journey from Angora to Constantinople on March 5,1927,
Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, American High Commissioner to Turkey, took
the ferry from Haydar Pasha Station to Perha with Mrs. Bristol. The cool
Mediterranean wind felt nicer than the cold and dusty Angora air during their short
but magical journey from the Asian to the European side of the city. Numerous
joyful embassy staff and the American residents of Constantinople greeted the
Bristols.1 The American Diaspora at Constantinople believed that the Turkish
treaty in Bristol’s briefcase, originally signed in 1923 at Lausanne, Switzerland but
never ratified by the Senate, would protect their schools, businesses and relief
efforts in the Near East. Although the 1923 Lausanne Treaty had been rejected by
the Senate only a month before, by sending Bristol to Angora right after the
Senate’s rejection, the Calvin Coolidge Administration officially recognized the new
Turkish Republic and agreed to have a relationship based on equality and
international law. This study explores the factors that contributed to the Senate’s
rejection of the Lausanne Treaty in January 1927. Furthermore, it explains how the
rejected Lausanne Treaty survived and was activated despite the Senate’s non
ratification.
This work will operate on four levels, each of which is influenced by four
historians and their theories. Although these historians, Walter LaFeber, Matthew

1 Mark Lambert Bristol, (Unpublished Diary), March 5, 1927, Box 8, File: February and March
1927, Mark Lambert Bristol Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington).
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Connelly, Michael Hunt and Kristin Hoganson, did not specifically write about
Turkish-American relations during the 1920’s, they influenced this work with their
approach to the origins of U.S. foreign policy. The first level argues that the U.S.
applied an Open Door policy between 1909 and 1927 in the Near East.
The U.S. Open Door policy emerged from the idea of preventing European
powers from creating spheres of influence in China so that the U.S. businesses
could invest freely in the region. When the U.S. decided to expand its influence
over the Pacific Ocean at the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers
had already parceled out China. Rejecting the European nations’ creation of
spheres of influence in China, John Milton Hay (1838-1905), Secretary of State,
sent notes to Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and France in 1899.1 Unlike
the traditional imperial tendencies of the old world powers, which was divide and
rule, the U.S. advocated maintaining the political entity of China while allowing all
powers to invest in the country freely. The U.S. began to apply the same policy to
the Near East during the William Taft administration. The Secretary of State at the
time, Philander C. Knox, was a strong advocate of the Open Door policy.
In his groundbreaking book, The New Empire, Walter LaFeber emphasized
that from the beginning the U.S. deliberately sought to establish an economic
empire.2 LaFeber challenged previously widespread theories that claimed U.S.
policy makers for a short period of time at the turn of the twentieth century fancied

1 Alexander DeConde, A History o f American Foreign Policy {New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1963), 363.
2 W alter LaFeber, The N ew Empire: An Interpretation o f American Expansion, 1860-1898 (N ew
York: Cornell University Press, 1963).
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creating an imperial power. According to these earlier theories, the imperial frenzy
ended during the early 1920’s.3 LaFeber, however, showed us that from the early
days of its establishment, the U.S. was destined to be an economic empire and
that was why according to him, the declaration of the U.S. as an imperial power in
mid nineteenth century was a logical historical development.4 The new-left
historians had already declared that the U.S. was established as an empire.5
Building his theory on this premise, LaFeber revolutionized the “empire” theory:
American industrialization during the nineteenth century and the maturation of the
empire went hand in hand.6 By the end of the nineteenth century, LaFeber
maintains that American capitalists and foreign policy makers came to a
conclusion that a U.S. economic empire “would be the balm for international and
domestic ills.”7 This thesis validates LaFeber’s theory in the sense that foreign
policy makers and businessmen helped each other to create a post-Great War
U.S. foreign policy for the Near East. Under this policy, the U.S. needed to apply
an Open Door framework in the region in order to maintain its economic growth by
exploiting the oil reserves of the Near East, as well as world peace.

3 For example, in his book, A m erica’s Colonial Experience: How the United States gained,
governed, and in part gave aw ay a colonial empire (N ew York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1951), historian
Julius W . Pratt claimed that the withdrawal from imperial power mentality began when Warren
Harding becam e president in 1921, 313.
4 LaFeber, 60.
5 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy o f American Diplomacy, second edition (N ew York:
Delta, 1962), 19. Richard W . Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (N ew York: W . W . Norton
6 Company, 1960), 1.
6 LaFeber, 6.
7 Ibid, 373.
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Second, during the Lausanne Conference, the Turks welcomed the U.S. Open
Door policy, and furthermore, they encouraged it. Turkey’s priority was to emerge
as a sovereign nation from the Lausanne negotiations. Their primary diplomatic
tool during the negotiations was to pit the U.S. Open Door policy against British
imperialism. Matthew Connelly studied the impact of the Algerian War of
Independence on great power politics. According to Connelly, the Algerian
Revolution was “distinctively diplomatic in nature, and most decisive struggles
occurred in the international arena.”8 He demonstrated that Algerian nationalists
exploited differences between super powers and played off them in order to
achieve independence.9 Algerian nationalists were aware of Cold War diplomacy
and created their own space within it to realize their independence. During the time
frame of Connelly’s book, mostly 1950’s and 1960’s, Algeria took advantage of the
Cold War ideological struggle. This work applies this small power strategy to the
Turkish War of Independence. During the 1920’s, great powers were struggling for
spheres of influence and natural resources. Turkish nationalists used this struggle
to their advantage by playing the U.S. against Britain.
Third, the public’s rejection of the Treaty provided policy makers with the
ideological foundation to shape their policy towards Turkey, usually in the form of
protecting American honor and racial and religious prejudice. The coalition against
normalized relations with Turkey and the Open Door policy, however, was not
sustained after the Treaty was rejected because a pragmatist approach gained
8 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins o f
the Post-Cold W ar Era (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.
9 Ibid, 277.
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ground among citizens, policy makers, and even those people who previously
opposed any type of relations with Turkey. This premise applies Michael Hunt’s
“ideology” in order to explain the relationship between public rhetoric against
Turkey and the Turks and the rejection of Lausanne Treaty.
Michael Hunt introduced ideology as the central component in foreign
policymaking.10 According to Hunt, ideology helps the policy makers and the public
to constitute a framework in which policy makers can “reduce complicated
problems to manageable proportions...to marshal support at home for the choices
they had made.”11 Thus, Hunt suggests ideology as a two-lane road: on one side,
policy makers explain complicated matters to the public by using simple and
ideologically loaded terms - national greatness, racial hierarchy and anti
revolutionary attitude. On the other side, by constantly making ideological choices,
people affect the policy makers’ decision making process. The “ideology” theory
helps us better understand the relationship between the anti-Turkish and antiMuslim attitude in public and the policy makers’ strategic approach towards U.S.Turkish relations.
Fourth, the opponents of ratifying the Lausanne Treaty advocated for
relinquishing the Open Door policy and the (re)establishment of a foreign policy
based on ethics and morality. The individuals, religious organizations, and interest
groups who demanded this shift mobilized against the U.S. policy in the Near East,
particularly against the 1923 Lausanne Treaty that they believed was a

10 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 3.
11 Ibid, 16.
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manifestation of the Open Door policy. Religious figures, nationalists and
Wilsonian moralists created a front that criticized the Open Door policy and
advocated to honor the previous promises of the U.S. towards the minorities in
Turkey. The opponents also despised the idea of establishing an equal
relationship with a backward, Muslim state that had recently massacred ten of
thousands of Christian Armenians. During the next four years, they pleaded for the
rejection of the Treaty. The anti-Open Door front fed its dissatisfaction with the
direction of U.S. foreign policy by creating a racial, gender and religious rhetoric.
The work of Kristin Hoganson helps define this phenomenon.
In her book, Fighting for American Manhood, Kristin Hoganson explained the
origins of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars. Hoganson
convincingly argued that gender politics was an influential factor in the
determination of U.S. foreign policy.12 According to her, a masculine desire to
defend American honor drove policy makers to the wars with Spain and the
Philippines. Hoganson illustrated that before the war with Spain over Cuba, there
were many accounts depicting Cuba as a female waiting to be rescued from
Spain.13 This work borrows Hoganson’s illuminating concept of the gender roles in
U.S. foreign policy and applies it to explain the way in which many individuals
rallied behind the idea of rescuing Christian women from brutal Turks.

12 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the
Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1998),

200 .
13 Ibid, 51.
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By using these four interrelated historical approaches as the framework, this
work illustrates that the U.S. applied an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near
East from 1908 through 1920’s. Furthermore, it argues that studying the public
debate over the Lausanne Treaty helps one to understand the way in which
gender, American honor and religious beliefs provided the policy makers with an
ideological rationale to oppose the Treaty. Finally, it demonstrates that a small
state, like Turkey, can create a role for itself in world politics and manipulate the
big power politics for its interests.
Signed on August 6,1923, the Lausanne Treaty reestablished diplomatic and
commercial relations between Turkey and the U.S., which had been severed with
the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917. As I will detail in this thesis, many
Americans accurately understood that the U.S.’s main objective was to make sure
that U.S. business interests had an equal share in the Near Eastern markets after
the Great War. These Americans believed that the U.S. served the interests of big
corporations, especially the Standard Oil Company of New York, by primarily
seeking oil concessions in the region. They opposed the premise that Open Door
should be the driving force of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, due to the Turkish
massacre of Armenian civilians during the Great War, they believed that ratification
of the Treaty would legitimize Turkish brutal acts and prevent Armenians from
building their own country.
In January, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson issued the Fourteen Points that
the U.S. wanted to accomplish at the end of the Great War. The twelfth point was
to abolish the Ottoman Empire and create independent national states - an

7
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Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia was one of them.14 In early 1920’s, because of
Wilson’s promise, many Americans believed that the U.S. had a legal as well as a
moral obligation towards the Armenians. The Treaty of Lausanne asked the
American people to forget Wilson’s promise to create an Armenian state in the
Near East, disregard the Turkish brutalities against the Christians during the war,
and be on equal terms with an under-developed Muslim state. Turks’ ill-treatment
of the Christian subjects was unacceptable to many Americans, who commonly
believed that young Christian girls were kept in harems in Turkey and forced to
marry Turkish men.
A combination of anti-Turkish sentiment and disdain for the Open Door policy
became a hotly debated domestic political issue when the Democratic Party added
a plank denouncing the Treaty to its election platform in 1924. This politicized antiTurkish and anti-Muslim attitudes, together with a broader dissatisfaction about the
materialistic direction of U.S. foreign policy, resulted in the rejection of the
Lausanne Treaty in January 1927.
Although many Americans revolted against the Treaty, there were also
Americans who supported the idea of establishing equal relations with the new
Turkish Republic. The supporters believed that the new Turkey was on its way to
becoming a country guided by rule of law. They claimed that the U.S. business,
philanthropic and educational interests in the region could be defended only by
ratifying the Treaty. In other words, Turkish laws would protect the American
people and properties in the country. When the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty

14 Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World W ar I, 1917-1921, (N ew York: Harper & Row,
1985), 482.
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finally came to the Senate floor in January 17, 1927, the Senate could not produce
the two-thirds majority to ratify the Lausanne Treaty although it did show large
support for the idea - while 54 voted for it, 30 rejected it.
A few weeks after the Lausanne Treaty was rejected, President Calvin
Coolidge asked Admiral Bristol to conclude a new treaty with Turkey. Bristol took
the train from Constantinople to Angora immediately. In less than two weeks
Bristol and the Angora government put together a new treaty which fundamentally
put the Lausanne Treaty into effect. The Democratic Senators who voted against
the Treaty remained silent for the most part about President Coolidge’s disregard
of their votes. According to one journalist, the major reason for this silence was the
fact that many Senators voted against the Treaty just to humiliate the President
before the upcoming presidential elections.15 After achieving their goal, they did
not question the President’s unilateral action to establish normal relations with
Turkey. The most serious response came from William H. King of Utah a year later
when he introduced a resolution that accused President Coolidge of violating both
the “spirit and letter of the Constitution.” 16
Although the U.S. Open Door policy in the Near East was attacked by many
Americans, it ultimately remained intact. This work argues that there were two
major reasons why the Open Door policy was challenged but not destroyed. First,
Open Door policy did not meet any resistance from Turkey, and in fact, Turkey

15 Constantine Brown, the Chicago Daily News correspondent at London, to Bristol, February 25,
1927, Bristol Papers.
16 Resolution 194, April 10, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 69, PT.4-6, P G .3493-6962, 1928
Cong. 70, Sess. 1, microfilm No. 178, 6142.
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openly advocated for U.S. involvement in the Near East. Turkey wanted the U.S.
to balance the European Allied powers’ imperialistic demands by extending its
Open Door policy into the Near East. When the first meeting at Lausanne did not
produce any results in late 1922, Turkey granted the Chester Concessions to gain
the U.S.’s support for the second round of meetings. In as much as the original
reason for the U.S.’s participation in the Lausanne Conference was to defend the
Open Door policy, the Turks made the application of the Open Door policy easy for
American diplomats.
Secondly, the public movement against the Treaty lost the support of many
Americans who believed that the criticism of the Treaty had lost touch with reality
and became mere racial and political propaganda. When the U.S. government
attempted to normalize its relations with Turkey based on the Lausanne Treaty
despite its recent rejection by the Senate, there was no strong opposition left to
mobilize against the government’s decision. This work postulates, therefore, that
small powers like Turkey influenced U.S. foreign policy by granting incentives.
Furthermore, a genuine American public movement against an aggressive Open
Door policy in the Near East lost its legitimacy due to relying on rhetoric based on
propaganda and generating an unfair racial prejudice against the Turks.

Historiography and Methodology

In the limited historical studies on Turkish-American relations during the
interwar period, there is not an extensive analysis of the rejection of the Lausanne
Treaty. The reason for this oversight is that the rejection of the Treaty in January
1927 did not have much impact on the subsequent relations between the two
10
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countries. After all, relations with Turkey were normalized quickly and historians
did not pay much attention to Turkish-American relations until the end of the
Second World War when Turkey became an early recipient of Marshall Plan aid.17
This work argues, however, that there is much to learn from the debate over the
Lausanne Treaty.
A detailed historical account of Turkish American relations during the 1920’s
was written by Leland James Gordon in 1932.18 Gordon’s book on U.S. relations
with Turkey between 1830 and 1930 from an economic perspective is still the most
authoritative study on the subject. According to Gordon, after the Lausanne Treaty
was signed, “an unexpected” opposition emerged in the U.S. By putting the
rejection of the treaty in their 1924 election plank, the Democratic Party made it a
political issue.19 Gordon explained that the negative view of the Ottoman Empire
and Turkey was due to their treatment of non-Muslims which caused the American
public to have a strong opinion about the treaty.20
An expert on Turkish-American relations between 1914 and 1939, Roger R.
Trask, rightly claimed that strong religious and Armenian-lobby opposition, as well
as the partisan struggle between the Republican and the Democratic parties, were

17 For instance, in his book, historian William Hale did not mention the U.S. role at the Lausanne
Conference. According to him, the major players were Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union.
Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 52. Hale claimed that the U.S.
withdrew from world politics after 1920, 3.
18

Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic
Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932).
19 Ibid, 22.
20 Ibid, 32.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the main factors behind the rejection of the ratification.21 By exploring several
resources in their books, Gordon and Trask created a well defined framework to
study the subject. But both Gordon’s and Trask’s examinations of the debate about
the Lausanne Treaty are incomplete. Trask also neglected to address the U.S.
Open Door policy in the Near East. By ignoring the relationship between the public
perception of the Lausanne Treaty and the decision making process of the
politicians, Trask did not identify the ideological origins of U.S. foreign policy.
Although Gordon convincingly established the historical background of the U.S.
Open Door policy in the Near East, he fell short of admitting its significance to the
Lausanne negotiations. He also disregarded the channels that the American public
used to influence the statesmen’s decisions. Furthermore, Gordon did not consider
the ways in which the Turkish diplomatic maneuvers affected the policy makers
during the Lausanne Conference. The most serious flaw of the book, however, is
Gordon’s unquestioning acceptance of the claim by Joseph Grew, the chief U.S.
negotiator at Lausanne, that Grew was not aware of the Chester Concession
during the Lausanne negotiations 22 Thus, Gordon missed the most important
piece in the U.S. foreign relations apparatus at Lausanne which was the Open
Door policy. The main objective of the U.S. at Lausanne was to protect the
Chester Concession against Britain.

21 Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914-1939
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 37.
22 Gordon, 33.

12
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After the bloody Great War, many historians believed that Americans wanted to
go back to “normalcy” and did not want the U.S. to involve itself in world affairs.23
The failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty in 1919 was considered to be the end of
Wilsonian idealism. It was believed that the election of 1920 was a referendum for
internationalism or isolationism and the American people preferred the latter. This
work, however, provides evidence that the American public was engaged by
international affairs during the 1920’s and it was their active participation in the
debate surrounding the Treaty that contributed to its rejection. The type of debate,
which was based in part on religion and, gender prejudices, the American public
generated, however, became a turn off for many Americans and undermined the
movement.
In this thesis, after briefly explaining Ottoman-U.S. relations during the
nineteenth century, the first chapter focuses on the Open Door policy of President
William Howard Taft in 1909 and 1910. This chapter generally relies on the
personal papers of Oscar Solomon Straus, the first Ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire. The second chapter narrates the Lausanne Treaty negotiations. It argues
that the U.S.’s main agenda was to implement the Open Door policy in the Near
East, especially against the imperial schema of Great Britain. Turkish nationalists
23 In his book, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1931 (N ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), the
historian John D. Hicks claims that “between 1922 and 1929 the U.S. abdicated its position of
world leadership, and focused its attention primarily upon domestic affairs,” 49. According to
Charles O. Lerche Jr., the 1920’s were the “renaissance of isolationism.” Lerche Jr. maintains
that American people could not understand the meaning of a great-power status and they fought
World W a r I “with emotional slogans and crusading zeal and without any rational understanding
of how to approach their idealistic g o al.. .for good or ill, Americans once again turned their backs
on the world.” Foreign Policy o f the American People (N ew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
119. The historian Arthur Link maintains that the internationalist coalition that Woodrow Wilson
put together “gradually disintegrated from 1917 to 1920 and disappeared entirely during the
campaign of 1920.” “W hat Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s?” The Historical
Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (July 1959), 839.

13
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took advantage of the tension between these great powers, and even increased it,
by granting the U.S. the Chester Concession during the negotiations. The third
chapter describes the public debate about the Lausanne Treaty in the U.S.
between 1923 and 1927. The epilogue explains the reasons why the antiLausanne Treaty movement did not succeed in preventing the U.S. from officially
recognizing Turkey, although it influenced the Senate to reject the Treaty.

14
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CHAPTER I

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: U.S. OPEN DOOR POLICY IN TURKEY

Early Years

Since the early years of its establishment, the U.S. wanted to trade in the Near
East.1 Since piracy was widespread in the Eastern Mediterranean, the first U.S.
official encounter in the Near East was with the Barbary Pirates. The Barbary
Pirates were located in Northern Africa and politically attached to the Ottoman
Empire. Countries that wanted to trade on the Eastern Mediterranean paid tribute
to these pirates in return for safety. The first Turkish-American meeting took place
in 1800 when Commodore William Bainbridge brought the U.S. tribute to
Constantinople.2 Signing an official treaty took another thirty years. The U.S. did
not want to approach the Ottomans while they were at war with Napoleon’s
France, thus potentially putting its relations with France at risk.3
The U.S. and the Ottoman Empire eventually concluded a trade treaty in May
1830. According to this treaty, the Ottoman Empire granted the U.S. extraterritorial
rights known as capitulations, which the Ottomans had already granted to the

1 Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, Revised Ed. (N ew York: Atheneum,
1968), 50-51.
2 Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), 7.
3 Ibid, 9.
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other major European powers.1 Leland Gordon explains capitulations as: “onestate
exercises certain sovereign functions within the boundaries of another state.”2
The Ottomans began to grant capitulations after the capture of
Constantinople from the Byzantium Empire in 1543. After this event, the
Ottomans, ruled by Islamic laws, became an empire truly and had direct contact
with Europe. According to the Islamic laws, only Muslims had exclusive rights for
trade.3 In order to encourage foreign investment in the Empire and not contradict
with the Islamic lows, the Ottoman Empire granted capitulations to Italian
merchants. Thus, these merchants would be subject to their own lows rather than
Ottoman laws.4
Until the beginning of the Great War, however, Turkish-American trade
remained on a modest level although the two countries maintained friendly
relations.5 The Ottoman Empire, for instance, was one of the rare countries that
supported the Union during the Civil War.6 American missionary and humanitarian

1 1bid, 190.
2 Gordon, 190.
3 Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, “The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their
Abrogation as it Affects the United States” The American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 17,
No. 2 (April 1923), 208.
4 Ibid, 209.
5 In his book, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century (Albany:
State University of New York, 1988), the historian Resat Kasaba indicates that during most of the
nineteenth century Great Britain was the leading trade partner of the Ottoman Empire. The United
States was the fifth trading partner after France, Austria and Russia, 87.
6 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the United States (Hereafter referred to as FRUS),
1862, Government Printing Office, Washington, 788. Quoted by Gordon, American Relations with
Turkey, 1830-1930, 12.
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institutions, on the other hand, flourished rapidly during the nineteenth century.7 As
of 1886-87 there were 419 American schools in the Near East with 16,205
students who were mainly Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, Bulgarians, and Roman
Catholics - only a small number of Muslims attended these schools.8

The First Open Door Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire: Oscar Solomon Straus.
1909-1910

With the dawn of the twentieth century, the U.S. was emerging as an empire.
A war with Spain over Cuba and Secretary Hay’s Open Door notes signified this
shift. Consequently, the U.S. perception of the Near East changed. The 1908
Young Turk revolution against the corrupt Abdulhamid II, and subsequent
declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Turkey, convinced U.S. policy makers
that this new country would be receptive to capitalism and American penetration.9
It was commonly believed among U.S. policy makers that because of its oil
reserves, additional natural resources, and need for reconstruction; the Near East
had become as important as China. This marked the beginning of a struggle
between the U.S. Open Door policy and Old World (German, British, and French)
imperialism in the Near East.10 U.S. policy makers believed that the Young Turks
could bring stability and the rule of law to the Ottoman Empire and make it

7 Gordon, 221.
8 Oscar Solomon Straus Papers, Box 1, File: Correspondence January-April 1888, (Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress).
9 Gordon, 57.
10 Ibid, 59.
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available for American commercial expansion.11 According to State Department
dispatches of the time, the new Young Turk regime also wanted to encourage U.S.
investment.12 President Taft and Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox
welcomed the opportunity to expand the American influence in the region. They
were committed to maintaining Hay’s Dollar Diplomacy.13
Born in Bavaria, Oscar Solomon Straus came to the U.S. as a child. After
practicing law in New York, he was appointed as the U.S. Minister to the Ottoman
Empire from 1887 to 1889, and again during the period of 1898-1901. Later, he
was the Secretary of Commerce and Labor during the Theodore Roosevelt
administration, 1906-1909. Afterwards, President Taft appointed him as the first
ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1909. The next year, he resigned from this
post citing private reasons. His private papers, however, indicated that his
discontent with the policies of the Secretary of State, Philander Chase Knox
(1853-921), was the primary reason for his resignation.
In the summer of 1908, the Young Turks, mostly military officers calling
themselves the Committee of Union and Progress, instigated a revolution against
the Sultan Abdulhamid II and forced him to reintroduce the 1876 constitution.14

11 The N ew York Times (NYT), Oct. 30, 1910, “Straus Would Quit Post in Turkey.”
12 Lewis Einstein, charge d'affaires to Knox, July 15, 1909, Embassy Archives, Dispatches to the
State Department, July 3, 1909 to Decem ber 29, 1909, Vol. 32. RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 10,
Compartment 5, Shelf 1. United States National Archives, Washington.
13 Herbert F. Wright; “Philander Chase Knox” in The American Secretaries o f State and Their
Diplomacy, Vol. IX, Ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis (N ew York: Cooper Square Publishers, INC, 1963),
327.
14 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (N ew York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 94.
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The new regime consolidated its power in April 1909 by deposing Abdulhamid II.15
The U.S. reaction to the reestablishment of the parliamentary regime was positive.
The acting U.S. Ambassador, John G. A. Leishman, predicted that the decline of
the Ottoman Empire would be halted by the Young Turks. He also predicted that
the Ottoman Empire would become a “highly civilized and progressive nation”
thanks to its natural resources.16 U.S. policy makers believed that the constitution
and the parliament would help to make the country stable for commercial
expansion.
In 1909, Straus’ term as Secretary of Commerce and Labor expired with the
Roosevelt Administration. While Straus planned to return to his law practice in New
York, President Taft and Secretary Knox offered him the Constantinople post.17
Taft and Knox told him that in view of the regime changes that had occurred in the
Empire, he was the most qualified man for the ambassador position.18 The epochmaking events occurring in the Turkish Empire provided challenges and
opportunities, which made that post take on an even greater significance. They
made it clear that the President needed his expertise and keen knowledge.19
Straus was not interested in the job as he had already worked there twice. Given

15 Ambassador Leishman to the Secretary of State, Constantinople, April 15, 1909. FRUS, 1909
(Washington: Government Printing Press, 1914), 563.
16 Ambassador Leishman to the Secretary of State, Constantinople , September 28, 1908. FRUS,
1908 (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1912), 749.
17 Oscar Solomon Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey - Random Notes, the Following Letters
from President Taft and Secretary Knox Explain Them selves”, an unpublished diary in Oscar
Solomon Straus Papers, Box 23, Diary 1909-10, 2 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
18 Ibid.
19 Knox to Straus, April 29,1909, Box 23, File: Correspondence 1909-10, Straus papers, 2.
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the choice, he would have preferred to go to Japan.20 When the President of the
United States told him that it was his patriotic duty to accept the Constantinople
post, however, Straus felt he could not decline the offer21
The relationship between Ambassador Straus and Secretary Knox was
troublesome. While Knox wanted to penetrate the region economically, Straus was
always skeptical about the possibility for America’s expansion in the Ottoman
Empire without getting entangled in Old World politics.22 Knox considered the Near
East as economically significant as China, but Straus strongly believed that any
major American investment in the Near East meant entanglement in the Eastern
Question, namely the partition of the crumbling Ottoman Empire.23 Knox expected
Straus to negotiate concessions for the building of railroads, mines and irrigation 24
Straus, on the other hand, considered these ventures extremely dangerous as
they would put the U.S. at odds with the major European powers as they were
deeply involved with the internal politics of the country.
Ironically, at a time when the U.S. government decided to increase its
economic influence and seek business opportunities overseas, the man they sent
as the first full ambassador to the Ottoman Empire opposed this shift in U.S.
foreign policy. Previously, Straus’s responsibilities focused mostly on advocating

20 President Taft to Straus, March 16,1909, Box 12, File: Correspondence March 1909, ibid.
21 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey”.
22 For an excellent narrative of the tension between Knox and Straus, see Naomi W . Cohen,
“Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909-1910: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy,” The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 (March 1959), 632-642.
23 Ibid, 633.
24 Ibid.
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for the rights of American religious and philanthropic institutions, especially
American schools. In his third mission to the Ottoman Empire, however, the
Department expected Straus to lay the foundation for the big American capitalists’
expansion into the Near East. During his short ambassadorship in the Ottoman
Empire, two important matters came up. First, Straus was expected to convince
the Ottoman government to allow American companies to bid for the enlargement
of the Ottoman Navy on equal terms as their British counterparts. The second
issue was the Chester Concession, a railway system that covered the entire
Eastern Anatolia and connected it to the oil reserves of today's Iraq. This
proposed railway network planned to extended from Baghdad and Mosul to both
the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Straus failed to deliver what Knox wanted on
both issues.
Straus’ first task was to enable American companies to bid for the Ottoman
navy enlargement program in early January 1910. The Ottoman Empire had lost
the majority of its domain in Europe by then. The newly emerged independent
states - Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia - now were on the offensive against the Sick
Man of Europe, and Greece coveted the island of Crete. The Ottoman
government, on the other hand, refused to relinquish Crete without a fight.
However they lacked the necessary forces to defend the island. This prompted the
Young Turks to move towards modernizing the Ottoman fleet.
After the Greek army entered into politics and dominated the government and
parliament, it forced the king to consent to the summoning of a National Assembly
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that would consist of delegates from around the country.25 Crete decided to send
delegates to this National Assembly, which declared the island as a part of
Greece. For the Young Turkish government this move was a casus belli.26 Bulgaria
was also preparing to take advantage of the situation between Greece and the
Ottoman Empire to make war upon Turkey either in conjunction with some of the
Balkan powers or by uniting with Greece. Greece had recently purchased in Italy a
man-of-war (armed naval vessel) of about ten thousand tons. Turkey was trying to
match that by purchasing a man-of-war of comparable size and power.
On January 19, 1910, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs presented Straus
with a memorandum showing the size of the ship and the strength of its
armaments that the Porte desired to purchase.27 The foreign minister promised
Straus that American shipbuilding firms could come to Turkey to submit bids 28
Straus sent a telegraph to the Department about the project. The Department
replied that they could not sell naval vessels without the consent of Congress and
this would require some time.29 Knox asked Straus to find out if any part of the
award was open to competition and if so to give effective and appropriate support
to the representatives of the Ottoman-Anglo-American Company and those of
such other reputable American firms as may wish to enter the competition.30

25 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 40.
26 Ibid.
. 27 Ibid.
28 Straus to the Secretary of State, April 7, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 3.
29

Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 41.

30 Straus to the Secretary of State, April 12, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid.
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Several companies, including the Ottoman-Anglo-American Company, Bethlehem
Steel, and a few shipbuilding companies, were already interested in the project.
In April, the Ottoman Cabinet decided in favor of a naval program involving an
annual expenditure of two million five hundred thousand dollars for a period of
eight years and providing for the construction of two battleships, three cruisers and
ten destroyers.31 This project was to be undertaken by British firms. Straus knew
that due to British political pressure, the Ottomans could not wait for the Americans
to get involved.32 The Minister of Marine told Straus that in order not to embarrass
the other powers they did not want to open the order to competition.33 He assured
Straus, however, that if the British bid fell through the U.S. was next in line for
consideration.34 This fait accompli, according to Secretary Knox, became an
embarrassment for the American interests in the region. Furthermore, Knox
accused Straus of lack of deliberation and care in furthering U.S. commercial
interests in the region. Straus also was angered by the commercial companies that
blamed either the Department or him for the failure of the Ottoman government to
follow up on its promises.35
In early March 1910, Straus was preparing to board the Embassy stationary,
the old and slow U.S.S. Scorpion.36 His first stop was going to be Athens to meet

31 Ibid, 2.
32 Ibid, 5.
33 Ibid, 2.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, 3.
36 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 53.
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his brother and his wife. Being fascinated by historical monuments, he could not
wait to visit the Greek ruins.37 Afterwards, Straus’s plan was to meet Theodore
Roosevelt in Egypt at the end of his Africa trip. Straus had an overwhelming
respect for Roosevelt. Through the years they remained close family friends. He
was looking forward to exploring the Pyramids together and hearing Roosevelt’s
many fascinating African hunting adventure stories. A long cable from the State
Department upset his plans.
The State Department indicated that they were unaware of Straus’ vacation
schedule. At a time when the U.S. interests were seeking important concessions in
the Ottoman Empire, it was not advisable for him to depart. He wired back to the
State Department indicating that there was nothing else he could do as far as the
enlargement of the Ottoman Navy issue was concerned. He believed that the
decision making process would take several weeks if not months. Furthermore, he
was uncomfortable by the extreme desire to push commercial enterprises with
more energy than understanding on the part of the State Department. Annoyed by
Straus’ attitude, Knox told him to continue his trip to Egypt to meet Roosevelt, but
expedite his return.38 When he returned from Egypt in early April, there was a
telegram from Knox waiting on his desk. Straus could almost hear Knox’s scolding
voice when he read the telegram. According to Knox, Straus was wrong when he
told the Department that the Porte would give several weeks postponement to

37

38

Ibid, 55.
Ibid, 56.
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receive bids from American ship builders for the construction of several war
vessels.39
The second issue Straus devoted much of his time to in Constantinople was
later to be known as the Chester Concessions. Through its local representatives,
Mr. Colby M. Chester and Mr. Colt, the American Development Company sought a
railway concession in Asia Minor. On March 6,1910 at a dinner in the Dolmabahce
Palace, Halajian Efendi, the Minister of Public Works, informed Straus that he had
concluded negotiations in regard to the railway concession with the American
group.40 Halajian Efendi was anxious to bring American capital into Turkey 41
This railway concession worried Straus about the strategy the U.S. was
developing in the region. During his visit in Turkey in 1898, the German Emperor
obtained a concession for building the Baghdad Railway.42 Presently the railway
reached the city of Konya in central Anatolia and the Germans expected to expand
it to Basra in the Persian Gulf.43 Since the Gulf region was England’s sphere of
influence, Straus projected that there would be a crisis in the region within a few
years. By gaining the Chester Concession, the U.S. would get drawn into this on
coming train wreck, as it would directly clash with the preexisting German projects
in the region and interfere with their railway monopolies 44 A crisis with the German

39 Ibid, 74.
40 Ibid, 52.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, 10.
43 Ibid.
44 Straus to the Secretary, August 4, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 2.
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Empire was the last thing the U.S. should have looked for. The American
Ambassador in Berlin informed Straus that Germany was uneasy about the
Ottoman-American Development Company’s railway concession in Asia Minor.45
Straus later learned that the German Ambassador in Constantinople informed the
Ottoman government that Germany opposed the granting of the American
concession 46
Straus believed that the political and commercial interests of foreign states
were closely allied in the Ottoman Empire 47 Great powers, such as Germany,
France, and England, had the purpose of furthering their political interests, and
they leveraged their political interests to push their commercial interests 48 Big
scale commercial interests, according to Straus, would need the strong and
consistent arm of the government for protection against unjust treatment.49 This, in
turn, would draw the U.S. into the political muddle of the “Eastern Question,” either
on the side of Turkey or on the side of England or Germany.50 By pushing Dollar
Diplomacy in the region, the Department was intermixing in Ottoman affairs, which

45 ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid, 4.
48 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 74.
49 Straus to the Secretary, August 4, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 6.
50 Ibid, 5.
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would lead the U.S. to disastrous international entanglements.51 In early August,
Straus decided to face Knox directly, discuss his views, and then resign.52
Straus visited Knox in late October 1910 and told him that he did not want to
return to Constantinople. He also cautioned Knox that large concessions would
cause possible political entanglements in the region.53 He explained to Knox that
the concession for the railroad should be obtained only with the backing of the U.S.
government in cooperation with the European powers 54 Knox responded that
since the Chester Concession had already progressed thus far, the U.S. should
continue to press for its conclusion. But if the Ottoman-American Development
Company backed out, the U.S. government should determine its policy so that it
would stay out of political entanglements.55 When Straus left Knox’s office, he felt
an instant relief and believed that he finally made his case in opposition to the
“paramount policy of eager desire of the administration to make a great showing of
advancing commercial interests regardless of consequences.”56
That same day he met with President Taft. Straus honestly confessed to the
President that he found working in Turkey discouraging because of the relationship
between concessions and politics.57 He continued drawing a distinction between

51 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 74-75.
52 Ibid, 75.
53 Ibid, 135.
54 Ibid, 139.
55 Ibid, 140.
56 Ibid, 141.
57 Ibid, 136.
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the necessary foreign policy in Central and South America and the Far East where
U.S. commercial and political interests complemented one another, versus in the
Ottoman Empire where the U.S. had no political interests. While Straus did not
foresee any potential clash of interests in these other regions with the European
powers, he believed that the Near East was going to be the cause of a general
European war.58 According to him, the U.S. involvement in the Eastern Question
indicated a serious departure from traditional U.S. foreign policy.59
A New York Times article summed up the differences between Secretary Knox
and Straus: Knox wanted to push for economic expansion rapidly without regard to
potential political consequences. Straus, on the other hand, wanted to proceed
with aggressive economic expansion only when it was diplomatically possible.60
Straus was never against international business. He believed that they were living
in an age of international commerce, and the people of the U.S. were in the
forefront, “both in the reward they reap and in the prosperity they enjoy.”61
According to Straus, international commerce could bring international peace for the
first time in human history. Commerce in its modern development was based upon
mutuality, and every ship that carried its products to foreign countries was a
messenger of peace and good will.62 If peace and American ethical standards

58 Ibid, 138.
59 Ibid, 99.
60 The New York Times, October 30, 1910, “Straus Would Quit Post in Turkey.”
61 Address as Secretary of Commerce and Labor at the Anniversary Celebration of the Savannah
Board of Trade, April 3, 1908, published by the Government Printing Office, 1908, found at Straus
Papers, Box 23, Diary 1908-1909, 6.
62 Ibid, 7.
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were not maintained in international commerce, however, the U.S. was on the way
to becoming a “degenerate” country.63 Straus devoted the rest of his career at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration to attain diplomatic harmony among nations.
After Straus resigned in 1910, the Ottoman Empire stumbled from one war to
another over the next ten years. Due to the instability in the region and the U.S.’s
entrance into the Great War, American policy makers paused their pursuit of an
aggressive Open Door policy. In 1919, led by the new U.S. High Commissioner to
the Ottoman Empire, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, the U.S. renewed its Open
Door policy effort at a new and unprecedented level.
The late government official and diplomatic historian Herbert Feis (18931972) called the 1920’s the decade when Dollar Diplomacy was prevalent.64 His
assessment describes U.S. activities in the Near East for the first half of the
1920’s when there was a consensus among policy makers and the business
class that American capital should go to wherever it was needed and there was a
potential for profit. After the U.S. signed the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey in
1923, however, there was a significant minority opinion in the U.S. that policy
makers acted immorally in order to maintain an Open Door policy in the Near
East. The next chapter illustrates the U.S. Open Door policy during the early
1920’s, and demonstrates the origins of the opposition to Open Door policy.

63 His Address, as Secretary of Commerce and Labor, at the Annual Banquet of the Traffic Club of
Philadelphia, The Union League, PA, February 27, 1909 (Washington: Government Printing Office
1909), ibid, 5.
64 Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy o f the Dollar: First Era 1919-1932 (Ham den, Connecticut: Archon
Books, 1965), v.
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CHAPTER II

KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN AT LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

The U.S. Open Door Policy in the Near East during 1920’s

Unlike previous wars, nations waged the Great War by relying on tanks and
airplanes. Towards the end of the War, it became clear that an increasingly
important component of a nation’s strength depended upon its oil reserves and
steel production capacity. Hoping to maintain its imperial power after the War,
Britain coveted the oil reserves of the Near East as its victory price. The United
States, meanwhile, proved that it had become perhaps the most powerful nation
both economically and militarily by 1920. The U.S. also recognized the importance
of the Near Eastern oil reserves for its future. During their peace negotiations with
the remnants of the Ottoman Empire first, and later the successor Turkey, the U.S.
strove to keep the region open to all investors regardless of their nationalities.
Britain, on the other hand, sought sole control of the Mesopotamian oil reserves in
today’s Iraq.
After the Great War, a triumphant Woodrow Wilson envisioned a League of
Nations under the leadership of the U.S. that would replace the Balance of Power
diplomacy that previously guided international relations prior to the war. Wilson
believed that the League of Nations would provide an environment in which all
countries were obliged to conduct their foreign relations peacefully through open
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dialogue and negotiation. He insisted that the 1920 presidential election was going
to be a referendum on this new world order, which the Senate had rejected in
1919.1 His opponent, Warren Harding, promised to take the American people back
to “normalcy.”2 Harding trusted that many Americans did not want the U.S. to get
involved with the world’s political affairs too closely. His election motto was to roll
back the Wilsonian era to the true nature of U.S. diplomacy that detested
entangling alliances. According to historian Charles Lerche Jr., the American
people fought the Great War with a “crusading zeal” without understanding “the
meaning of great-power status.” This confusion, Lerche concludes, led the
American people to reject Wilson’s world-community vision.3
Two interrelated beliefs influenced U.S. foreign policy during the 1920’s: fear of
the collapse of the world economy, and distrust of politicians and bureaucrats who
failed to prevent the Great War. American policy makers and businessmen
assumed that the U.S. could not maintain its wealth when the major customer
nations could not buy American industrial and agricultural products. The conviction
that U.S. wealth depended upon a stable world economy led policy makers to
encourage American businessmen to invest overseas. Thus, policy makers and
the business class believed that in order to open new frontiers for American
businesses, the U.S. needed to invest in war-damaged nations so that they would

1 Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 44-45.
2 L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933 (N ew Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1968), 4.
3 Charles O. Lerche Jr., Foreign Policy o f the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1961), 119.
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generate their own wealth. In his book, historian Michael J. Hogan described this
consensus between the policy makers and American businesses as an “Informal
Entente.”4 According to Hogan, both parties would take “cooperative action” in
order to “achieve peace and prosperity.” In this cooperation, Hogan maintains,
U.S. administrations during the 1920’s protected private interests abroad.5 Another
historian, Herbert Feis, concurs and claims that as a result the Harding, the
Coolidge and Hoover administrations actively encouraged foreign investment.6
After an interregnum period during which the Wilson administration based its
foreign policy on internationalism and moral leadership, the U.S. returned to the
Open Door policy after the election of Warren Harding. Once again, Philander
Chase Knox’s style of commerce-based diplomacy became fashionable, although
it met with occasional setbacks. In the case of relations with Turkey, the opposition
to the Open Door policy was overwhelming because it unified different sections of
U.S. society. These sections consisted of church leaders and their followers,
Wilsonian politicians some of whom were opportunists, and those who
categorically rejected establishing relations with Muslims. This opposition to the
Open Door policy differed philosophically from Straus’s more than a decade
earlier. In his time, Straus had disapproved the Open Door policy because it paid
no attention to the traditional balance of power in the Near East and potentially
positioned the U.S. in opposition to the European powers. Straus was not against

4 Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure o f Cooperation in Anglo-American
Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977).
5 Ibid, 1.
6 Feis, The Diplomacy o f the Dollar, 5-6.
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the idea of free trade nor dealing with Muslims. Straus clashed with Knox because
he believed Knox’s foreign policy to be unnecessarily confrontational. As a
pragmatic diplomat, Straus concluded that the profit the U.S. may earn in the Near
East would be less than the risk it took by agitating Britain and Germany. During
the twenties, however, as the following pages will demonstrate, the opponents of
the Open Door policy in the Turkish case were predominantly Wilsonian—
moralistic and idealistic. They claimed that the Open Door policy was immoral and
damaged U.S. honor.
In early 1920’s, it was a common belief among policy makers and
businessmen that the American market would not be sufficient for American
producers in the near future. That was why it was important to look for new
markets. In addition, many American businessmen were convinced that they could
conduct more peaceful international relations than politicians and diplomats.7 After
all, these politicians and diplomats were responsible for the most destructive war in
history. The American business class welcomed the opportunity to use their
surplus money and manufacturing goods around the world. In their second World
Congress at Rome in 1923, for instance, the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) declared that businessmen from all nations would maintain the peace rather
than the “ignorant and impractical politicians and bureaucrats.”8

7 In his book, The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis o f the Old Order 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1957), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. claims that after the war there was “an age of business”
when “an economic success and metaphysics of optimism” were predominant, 71.
8 Julian Gillespie to Bristol, June 4, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June 1-31 1923, Mark
Lambert Bristol Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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At the conference, the ICC adopted a resolution that accused the Old World
regimes of failing catastrophically by causing the Great War and dragging
humanity into the biggest tragedy.9 According to the resolution, businessmen did
not have a political agenda - they worked for the enhancement of profit and that
was good for the masses. Fred I. Kent, Vice President of Bankers Trust Company
of New York, said that “the impracticable, the ignorant and the vicious” political
leaders caused misery and disasters for the masses. The time, he asserted, had
come for businessmen to stop this destructive system.10 With its resources,
namely oil, and the potential to be a new market place, the Near East was one of
the destinations on which the ICC focused.
That same year, the ICC published the “Report of the Present Situation in
Turkey December 1922.”11 This report was based largely on contacts made
through American officials of the State Department and the courtesy of the
American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. According to this report, although
industries were non-existent in Turkey, the country was rich with mineral wealth
such as gold, silver, lead, copper, iron, coal and oil.12 The oil fields of Mosul
discovered by the Germans, the report claimed, had become one of the biggest
victory prizes for the Allied forces. Additionally, the copper deposits in eastern
Anatolia were reputed to be among the richest in the world. The report concluded

9 Julian Gillespie to Bristol, June 4 ,1 9 2 3 , ibid.
10 Ibid, 7.
11 Bristol to Basil Miles at Rome, International Chamber of Commerce, March 1 2 ,1 9 2 3 , Box 39,
File: Correspondence March, 1-31, 1923, ibid.
12 Ibid, 9.
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that the Asiatic possessions of Turkey constituted a promising market for the
products of industrial Europe and America.13 Although American capital was
welcome almost anywhere in the world, the U.S. struggled to have a foothold in
the Near Eastern oil reserves because of the British dominant imperial presence
in the region.14
Under the leadership of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill,
Britain built a division of fast battleships fed by oil between 1911 and 1914.15 After
this transition in its navy, having steady access to oil supplies became a national
policy for Britain. The Great War reemphasized the importance of oil for the
industrialized countries.16Towards the end of the Great War, the British
government declared that it was going to be their fixed policy to keep aliens out of
oil properties both in the British dominions and in foreign neutral countries.17
The U.S. Navy also converted their ships from coal burners to oil burners
before the war.18 Since the U.S. was using the reserves within its own borders and
in Mexico until the end of the War, American policy makers did not need a
concrete foreign oil supply policy until the end of the Great W a r.19 The U.S.

13 Ibid.
14 Feis, The Diplomacy o f the Dollar, 48.
15 John A. DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World W ar I," The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 4. (March 1955), 654.
16 Ibid, 656.
17 DeNovo, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920” The
American Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (July, 1956), 860.
18 DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World W ar I,” 641.
19 Ibid.
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appreciated the significance of oil not only as an indispensable fuel but also as a
lubricant after its wartime experience.20 At the end of the war, oil experts
concluded that the U.S. had only thirty years worth of oil reserves.21 The oil
industry and government officials now considered that the national interests were
in serious jeopardy due to the depletion of domestic petroleum reserves and British
inroads into the remaining promising oil fields of the world, particularly those of
Asia Minor22 U.S. oil companies realized that by 1919 the British companies,
which were currently turning out less than five per cent of the world’s production,
had acquired more than half the world’s estimated future reserves, mostly through
the Turkish Petroleum Company.23 Although the U.S. declared that it did not have
any expansionist ambitions before the war, the U.S. government advocated for the
Open Door principle, which would give equal access to all powers and forbid any
exclusive rights in the Middle East after the war.24 Britain, on the other hand,
viewed the Near Eastern resources as its ultimate Great War victory prize.
In 1914, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands had agreed to share the oil
reserves of the Near East by establishing the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) half owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (British), a quarter by Dutch Shell,
and a quarter by a German company. The TPC obtained the exclusive rights to

^ibid
21 DeNovo, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920,” 857.
22 Ibid, 874.
23 Ibid, 865.
24 Edward Mead Earl, “The Turkish Petroleum C o m p a n y -A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1924), 265.
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exploit the vast oil deposits of Mosul and Baghdad from the Ottoman government
the same year.25 After the war, the German shares in the company were nullified,
and an Anglo-French-Dutch monopoly was created in mandated Iraq.26
In April 1920, Britain and France came together in San Remo, Italy to
conclude the partition of the previously Ottoman-ruled areas. At the conference,
France took over the German shares of TPC, and Britain and France established
complete authority over the Mesopotamian oil fields.27 Britain planned to establish
a pipe line from Mesopotamia through Syria (then under French mandate) to the
Eastern Mediterranean 28 The San Remo Treaty, according to the U.S.
government, ran counter to their Open Door policy. The U.S. Secretary of State,
Bainbridge Colby, protested the San Remo agreement on the grounds that the
mandated areas were to be administered and kept open to all the nations.29
Colby further indicated that Near Eastern oil “interested public opinion in the U.S.
as a potential subject of international strife.”30

25 Feis, The Diplomacy o f the Dollar, 50-51.
26 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. II (N ew York: The Macmillan Company, 1951),
572.
27 Earl, “The Turkish Petroleum Company,” 273.
OQ

Feis, The Diplomacy o f the Dollar, 51.
29

Edward Mead Earl, “The Turkish Petroleum Com pany,” 274.

30 Mr. Colby to Lord Curzon, November 20, 1920: “Correspondence between His Majesty’s
Government and the United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated
Territories,” Parliamentary Papers. Command, 675, 1921. Cited by Feis, The Diplomacy o f the
Dollar, 52.
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American oil companies were also interested in investing in the region.31
During the early 1920’s, U.S. policy makers and American businesses, especially
the Standard Oil Company, pursued an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near
East. Unlike the reluctant Open Door diplomat Oscar Solomon Straus, this time the
U.S. had an ideally suited representative in the region. During his tenure in Turkey
between 1919 and 1927, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol devoted his time to
protecting U.S. commercial interests by combating the Allied’s attempt to
colonize the region and negotiating concessions with the Turkish government.

Mark Lambert Bristol: An Open Door Diplomat in Constantinople

The Wilson administration assigned Admiral Mark Bristol as the High
Commissioner to Constantinople to protect U.S. institutions and interests in the
Allied-occupied Near East in August 1919. Earlier Bristol served with distinction as
commander of a naval ship in European waters.32 He was also a member of the
International Armistice Commission in Belgium in November 1918.33 Bristol made
opening the door for the Standard Oil Company his top priority by revitalizing the
earlier Chester Concession.34 The Standard Oil Company supported the Chester
Concession partly because one of the railway concessions included the rights to
31 Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and The Mandates System: A Study o f Economic Equality
Before and Since the Establishment o f the Mandate System (London: George Allen & Unwin
LTD., 1930), 141.
32 Dr. C. F. Gates, President of Robert College, Constantinople, “The Departure of Admiral Bristol,”
The Levant Trade Review, May 1927, Vol. XV, No. 5, 183, found at Box 91, Album-News Clippings,
Bristol Papers.
33 Ibid.
34 Bristol to Secretary of State Sept. 7 ,1 9 2 1 , Box 72 File: Ottoman Empire - Commercial
Jan-Dec.1921, ibid.
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exploit the underground resources of the region, especially Mosul’s oil fields. It did
not want to abandon this source of wealth to the British Turkish Petroleum
Company.35
Bristol was a quintessential Open Door diplomat of his time. He believed that
current foreign policy should be governed by financial and commercial
considerations, and the future reconstruction of the world should be based upon
advice from financial and commercial circles. Bristol believed that the U.S. could
assist underdeveloped countries by helping them to create strong economies. He
was convinced that political problems would be resolved if people rallied around
quality of life issues as opposed to ideological or nationalist ones.36 He was
convinced that it was the U.S.’s obligation to help the Turks establish their new
government and new laws.37
Bristol believed that during the war and its aftermath, the religious and
sentimental conduct of foreign affairs masked the real issues. According to Bristol,
idealistic and moralistic goals were accomplished most effectively by practical
means, such as fixing the economic problems of nations.38 He was convinced that
Dollar Diplomacy would result in peace among nations and would help the U.S. to
find markets for its surplus products. The Admiral thought that the U.S. should take

35 Miller Joblin, General Manager of Standard Oil Company of N Y to Bristol, November 2 9 ,1 9 2 2 ,
Box 38 File: Correspondence Nov. 1 -3 0 1922, Bristol Papers.
36 Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 131 1923, ibid, 9.
37 Bristol to Basil Miles at Rome, International Chamber of Commerce, March 1 2 ,1 9 2 3 , ibid, 4.
38 Bristol to Allen W . Dulles, Dept of State, January 19, 1923, Box 38, File: Correspondence Dec. 129 1922, ibid, 6.
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part in the solution of the economic problems of the world and it should start in the
Near East by providing “assistance, advice and sympathy.”39 Bristol believed just
as strongly that the U.S. needed to have foreign markets to absorb its surplus
production of all kinds.40 In the near future, U.S. production capacity wouJd exceed
demand. Therefore, the U.S. should begin to look for new markets because “in a
very few years the old European countries that were knocked out by the Great War
would be back on their feet” and demand their share 41 Britain was already
demanding the resources of the Near East for itself.
In 1919 when Bristol arrived in Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman
Empire, it had been under Allied occupation for almost a year. It took the Allied
governments another year to make a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire
because their first priority was to deal with Germany. The Allied governments and
the Ottoman Empire finally signed the Sevres Treaty near Paris in the summer of
1920, which certified the British mandate over Iraq and Palestine, French
dominance in Syria and Lebanon, and Greek control of western Asia Minor and
Thrace. Several islands including Rhodes on the Aegean Sea were given to
Italy; Armenians and the Kurds were slated to have a national land in Eastern
Anatolia; and the Turks would have a small national land in central Anatolia.
Although the Ottoman government signed the treaty, a Turkish nationalist
movement was growing rapidly against the occupation of Asia Minor by Greece.

39 Bristol to T.C. Perkins, Perkins and Company, January 2 5 ,1 9 2 4 , Box 41 File: Correspondence
Dec. 15-31 1923, ibid.
40 Bristol to Julius H. Barnes, President of the Chamber of Commerce, October 30, 1923, Box 40,
File: Correspondence July 1-31 1923, ibid, 3.
41 Ibid.
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In May 1919, Greek forces crossed the Aegean Sea and occupied Smyrna.
This occupation and their movement towards central Anatolia caused an uproar
among many Turks. During the next two years, under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), the Turks rejected the terms of the Sevres Treaty and
fought a successful war against Greek occupation. Thus, in early 1921, there
were two governments, the Ottoman government in Constantinople and the
Turkish nationalist government in Angora. Sensing the strength and possible
success of the Angora government, the American High Commission decided to
open negotiations with them. In fact, the Russian, French and Italian
governments already had diplomatic relations with the nationalists. The French
and Italians were trading with the nationalists through the cities of Samsun and
Trabzon on the Black Sea region.42 In need of money and legitimacy, the
nationalists welcomed relations with the U.S. and wanted American companies
to invest in the region.
The U.S. High Commission and the Angora government began to
communicate in early 1921. Julian Gillespie, the U.S. Commercial Attache,
helped Bristol to identify investment opportunities and revitalize the Chester
Concession. Late in March, C. K. Streit, journalist from the Philadelphia Public
Ledger, returned from a visit to the Angora government and informed Gillespie
that Mustapha Kemal Pasha and other high officials of the nationalist

42 Julian Gillespie to the Director of the Department of Commerce, MacElwee, 31 March 1921,
Constantinople. RG 151 Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, General
Records, 1914 - 1958. Trade Promotion Europe, N ear East, Canada, & Alaska 448, Russia
(Trade w/U.S, 1939-Vanderlip)-449, Near East (Arabia) (Hereafter referred to as RG 151) Box
No. 1990. Entry 1. (RG 151, Stack Area 570, Row 52, Compartment 23, Shelf 07, United States
National Archives, College Park). Folder: Turkey - Discrimination Against American Interests.
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government wanted a commercial representative of the American government
to come to Angora.43 The nationalists needed agricultural machinery,
automobiles, trucks and railroad equipment in Anatolia. They preferred U.S.
investment because they believed that unlike Britain, the U.S. had no political
ambitions for the region. In another instance, Robert McDowell, an American
relief worker at Samsun, informed Admiral Bristol that officials of the Angora
government repeatedly requested that a U.S. commercial delegate be sent to
Angora to talk over possible business relations.44
Gillespie suggested to the Department of Commerce that an official trip to
Anatolia would be beneficial to U.S. interests. He proposed to secure information
concerning construction of railway lines - the Chester Concession - that would
connect major Anatolian cities. Gillespie was also interested in finding out the
extent of agricultural machinery needs in Anatolia, as well as discovering other
materials for import such as tobacco, opium, wool and m ohair45 From late
December 1921 to early January 1922, Gillespie spent time in and around
Angora making inquiries concerning the economic situation, transportation
facilities, mines and ports of Anatolia with a view to interesting American capital
investment46 At the end, he was convinced that there were many opportunities
for American businesses investment. The Angora government officials welcomed

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Bosphore, Dec. 29, 1921, RG 151, ibid.
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Gillespie’s assessment and promised to assist American capitalists.47 Mustafa
Kemal Pasha told Gillespie that he would be pleased to see American capital
participate in the task of recreating Anatolia.48
Gillespie informed Bristol that the Turks were going to fight till the end to
regain the national pact territories 49 He reported that the Turks seemed to be
tolerant towards Christians but there was an antagonism to the interference of
religion in politics, whether Christian or Muslim. They did not have Bolshevik
inclinations and fully realized that both their religious and economic organization
precluded Bolshevism. They were eager to give America options on certain
construction work and natural resources in order to prevent monopolization of the
European Powers through the peace treaty. There was a disposition to revive the
Chester Concession and a willingness to discuss American participation in the
exploitation of Kurdistan’s oil.50
Admiral Bristol played a major role in obtaining the concession.51 He believed
that such a business venture would permit the U.S. to legitimately influence
European political affairs without the U.S. government’s entering into any
entangling alliances.52 The State Department gave a green light to Bristol to

47 Aksam, January 4, 1922, ibid.
48 Le Reveils January 2, 1922, ibid.
4Q

Bristol to Secretary of State, Feb. 21, 1922, Box 77 File: Turkey-Commercial 1922,
Bristol Papers.
50 Ibid, 2.
51 Bristol to A.W . Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 131 1923), ibid, 5.
52 Ibid, 8.
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support the Chester Concession. In a telegram dated 1922, Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes asked Bristol to keep the Department informed about the
status of the Chester negotiations with the Angora government, with a special
reference to territory covered and modifications of any original projects.53 Around
the same time, Admiral Bristol provided Arthur Chester, the son of the man who
obtained the original concession in 1909, with an official letter so that he could
travel around Anatolia freely and sign a concession deal with the Angora
government.54 Turkish officials promised that they would seek to pass the
concession in the Parliament.
While Bristol was attending the first Lausanne conference in 1922, Arthur
Chester sent him a letter and requested that the U.S. support the Chesters’ claims
in Mosul. Chester explained that the Turks hoped to harm the British claims in the
region by encouraging American investment in Mosul.55 Chester further explained
that according to his father, Mosul was not a part of Mesopotamia. Since it was
east of the Tigris River, it was not included in the English mandate, and therefore it
was legally an integral part of Turkey.56 Chester concluded that U.S. government
support would have great bearing on the value of the concession.57 Bristol and the
State Department heard this request and crafted their Lausanne strategy around
supporting the Chester Concession.
53 Hughes to Bristol, November 29, 1922, Box 77 File: Turkey-Commercial 1922, ibid.
54 U.S. High Commission Office at Constantinople to Bristol at Lausanne, November 29, 1922, Box
69 File: Lausanne Conference 1922. On this document, Chester requests another support letter
similar to one he received from Bristol in August 1921, ibid.
55 Arthur Chester to Bristol October 22, 1922, Box 41 File: Correspondence Oct. 13-31 1923, ibid.
56 Ibid, 2.
57 Ibid.
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First Conference

At the end of 1922, the Greek army in Asia Minor was crushed by the Turkish
nationalists. The Allied powers accepted the fact that they could not impose the
Sevres Treaty upon the Turks anymore. In order to resolve the Eastern question
once and for all, the Allied governments and the countries around Turkey sent their
finest diplomats to the Alpine city of Lausanne in Switzerland in November 1922.
They wanted to pressure the Turks into signing a treaty that would allow them to
establish their own semi-autonomous country. The Allied powers wanted Turkey to
pay for war reparations as well as to maintain the capitulations. They hoped that
the new Turkish nationalist government would sign a watered down version of the
Sevres Treaty. Having just beaten the Greeks on the battle field and consolidated
their power in Anatolia, however, the Turks came to Lausanne self-confident and
with a desire to have complete independence. The Turks believed that they held
enough cards to abolish the capitulations and gain as much territory as possible.
The U.S. government decided to attend the Lausanne Conference just as an
observer. Although they joined the Great War on different sides, the Ottoman
Empire and the U.S. never officially declared war on each other. Therefore, the
U.S. policy makers did not think it was necessary for the U.S. to officially make
peace with the Turks. When the U.S. entered the Great War on the side of the
Allied powers in 1917, the Ottoman Empire severed its relations with the U.S. and
denounced the capitulations as the basis of their relations.58 The U.S.’s objective

58 Edward W . Turlington, “The American Treaty of Lausanne” World Peace Foundation
Pamphlets (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), 565.
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at Lausanne was to re-establish pre-war relations with the Turkish government maintain the capitulations, prevent the Allies from establishing spheres of influence
in the Near East, and protect the newly emerging Chester Concession.
It was additionally important to the Department of Commerce that the U.S.
should be represented at Lausanne because the present occupation regime
excluded the Americans and prevented them from investing freely in the region.
The entire U.S. standing in this part of the world, the commercial attache Paul
Edwards maintained, could be injured. According to Edwards, Turkey was a
gateway to the Danube countries, Southern Russia, Transcaucasia, Turkistan,
Persia and Anatolia, and “any discussion of a revision of the Sevres Treaty also
raised the question of the status of territorial disposition of Syria, Palestine and
Mesopotamia.”59
The U.S. was represented by three diplomats: Mark Bristol, Richard
Washburn Child, Ambassador to Italy, and Joseph Grew, Ambassador to
Switzerland. In his diary, Grew confided that the chief obstacles were going to be
capitulations, financial clauses, and Mosul.60 Child, head of the U.S. delegation,
talked to the Turkish delegate to discover the Turkish strategy. The Turks
indicated that they did not want mandates, zones of influence, secret clauses, or
a territorial home for Armenians or other minorities. The Turks wanted American
development equal to or exceeding participation of any other nation in the Mosul

59 U.S. High Commission at Constantinople to Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, Department of Commerce 11 February, 1922, RG 151, 7.
60 Joseph Grew Diary, January 3, 1923, an unpublished diary, No. 22, Joseph Grew Papers,
(Houghton Library, Harvard College Library), 3.
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oil fields. They expressed full willingness to protect American philanthropic,
educational and religious organizations.61 Throughout the first and second
conferences, the Turks tried to conclude a separate treaty with the U.S. in order
to have bargaining chips against Britain and France.62
One of the attendees of the opening ceremony was Benito Mussolini, the
newly elected Prime Minister of Italy. In his meeting with Child and Grew,
Mussolini opined that the French and British had different agenda. He thought
that the Turks were absolutely stubborn and predicted an early break-down of the
conference.63 Mussolini’s forecast turned out to be true.
The conference began with a welcome speech from Robert Haab, the
President of the Swiss Confederation. Then Lord Curzon, the Chairman of the
conference from Britain, made a speech and explained the structure of the
meeting. No other speeches were planned, but Ismet Pasha, the head of the
Turkish delegation, arose and made a speech “controversial and threatening in
tone.” 64 In the speech, Ismet blamed the Western powers for all the misery that
Near Eastern peoples had to endure 65 Grew looked at Mussolini’s face at that
moment and Mussolini appeared as if he was about to lunge at Ismet’s throat.66

61 Ibid, November 22, 1922, ibid, 161.
62 Ibid, November 29, 1922, ibid, 175.
63 Grew, November 20, 1922 (unpublished diary), Grew Papers, 154.
64 Ibid.
65 Lausanne Conference on N ear Eastern Affairs,1922-1923. Records o f Proceedings and Draft
Terms o f Peace, Presented to Parliament byCommand of His Majesty (London: Majesty’s
Stationary Office, 1923).
66 Grew, November 20, 1922, Diary, Grew Papers, 154.
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Ismet Pasha was not a diplomat. He came to Lausanne because Mustafa
Kemal trusted him most. Although Ismet was not the ablest negotiator, Mustafa
Kemal knew him to be neither a Bolshevik nor an Anglophile. In addition to his lack
of diplomatic skills, Ismet was almost completely deaf. His secretary sat beside
him and took notes so that Ismet could read them as they were written. That was
why there was always a delay in the Turkish delegate’s response to the discussed
issues. The other delegates found this delay nothing but irritating.67 Grew did not
have a high opinion of Ismet’s intelligence, especially since he was a soldier.68
Ismet, however, would play a crucial role in the creation of an independent Turkey
by sometimes playing the role of a clueless deaf man, sometimes a victorious
general, and sometimes a drinking buddy of Grew and Child.
Early in the conference, Child declared to the Allied diplomats that the U.S.
was against any type of special privileges in the Near East. This statement, Grew
described, had “a bombshell effect.” The Allied representatives realized that the
U.S. was going to press for open access in the region. It was clear to them,
especially Britain, that the rationale behind this statement was oil.69 Later,
journalists asked Grew if Child’s speech would be interpreted as the U.S.
interfering in European affairs, but Grew rejected this idea.70 Child later made a
speech to the delegates and said that the U.S. was here to protect U.S. interests:
commercial, humane and financial. In that speech, Child indicated that the U.S. did
67 Ibid, November 24, 1922, ibid, 170.
68 Ibid, February 4, 1923, ibid, 60.
69 Ibid, November 25, 1922, ibid, 171.
70 Ibid.
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not seek “special privilege or favor” - just an “open door” for all powers in the Near
East, freedom of the straits and the Black Sea, and the safety of the minority
populations.71
At a sub-committee meeting, Italian and British delegates spoke in favor of an
Armenian state in eastern Anatolia on January 6.72 Riza Nur, the second man in
the Turkish delegation, interrupted the speech and left the committee room. The
Allied representatives protested against this action of the Turks.73 This was an
early indication that it was not going to be easy or even possible to formulate any
concrete plan for minority independence peacefully.74 The Armenian homeland
issue was not raised again seriously after this stand off. At the other sub
committee meetings, Turks rejected every Allied attempt to limit the new republic’s
sovereignty. It became clear that the Allied diplomats could not make a satisfactory
agreement with the Turks regarding capitulations, debt control, and the status of
minorities.75
During the conference, the Turkish and the American delegates were friendly
towards each other. For instance, the Turks gave a dinner party at the hotel in
which they were staying. Afterwards, Ismet refused to let Grew and Child depart.

71 Ibid, January 31, 1923, ibid, 43.
72 In his telegram to the Turkish Prime Minister three weeks earlier, Ismet indicated that Britain
and France planned to advocate for an Armenian homeland. Thus, Ismet believed, they wanted
to use the Armenian state issue as a bargaining chip to keep the Turks in check in their quest for
Mosul. Bilal N. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari: Turk Diplomatic Belgelerinde Lozan Baris Conferansi,
Vol. I (Ankara: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1990), 167.
73 Grew, January 6, 1923, Grew Papers, 5.
74 Ibid, 7.
75 Ibid, January 8, 1923, ibid, 7-8.
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All three of them instead went to a private room and Ismet drank so fast that Grew
was stunned. Grew and Child promised that they would take Ismet to the U.S. and
show him Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon and the White House if he signed two
treaties — one with the Allies and one with the U.S.76 The U.S. delegates
reciprocated by arranging an official dinner for the Turks. The Turks said they were
happy with the U.S. attitude in general, although they were disappointed by the
U.S. support for an Armenian national home. They appreciated, however, that the
U.S. had to take this stand because of the American public’s support for the
Christian minorities in Turkey.77 It was the Turks’ struggle with Britain for Mosul
during the conference that brought the countries together.
At the conference, Ismet claimed Mosul for the Turks because it belonged to
the Ottoman Empire before the Great War and the population of the region
consisted of Turks and Kurds.78 Lord Curzon countered by pointing out that the
Turks were now only 12 percent of the population. Curzon further explained that
Britain gave a promise to the Arab nations to protect their independence; that
Kurds were not Turks; and they did not want to live under Turkish rule. Mosul
traded with Aleppo, Syria and Baghdad, not Anatolia. Turkish control of Mosul was
bad for the security of Iraq. Curzon denied the Turkish allegations that Britain was
in the region to exploit the oil reserves.79 Curzon said that they recognized the right
of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but that the oil should be open to all nations,
76 Ibid, January 18, 1923, ibid, 22.
77 Ibid, January 29, 1923, ibid, 39.
78 Ibid, January 23, 1923, ibid, 28.
79 Ibid, 29.
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and Britain was prepared to send the Mosul case for arbitration to the League of
Nations. Ismet rejected arbitration and offered a plebiscite instead. Curzon
countered by saying that a plebiscite was not reliable because the population was
illiterate. At the same meeting, Child commented that the U.S. appreciated Britain’s
efforts to keep Mesopotamia open for other nations. He, however, felt it necessary
to refer to Curzon’s specific mention of the validity of the claims of the Turkish
Petroleum Company.
Having observed the negotiations between Turkey and Britain over Mosul, the
U.S. delegate decided to support Turkey’s claim in early January. While the
conference was taking place, a group of Americans were in negotiations with
Turkish officials in Angora in order to revitalize the Chester Concessions. When
obtaining this concession became a strong possibility in early January, the U.S.
delegate informed Ismet that if his government granted the concession, the U.S.
would support Turkish claims in Mosul.80 Although the documents under study are
silent on the Turkish response, the following events indicate that the Turks must
have accepted this offer. That was why, perhaps, Child indicated in late January
that Britain did not have the right to claim the Mosul region.81
Almost two months after the conference started, there was no sign of a
consensus at the sub-committee meetings. Finally, France and Britain agreed to
give an ultimatum to the Turks. If the Turks did not sign the treaty, the Allied

80 Bilal N. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari, 340.
81 Grew, January 23, 1923, Grew Papers, 31.
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diplomats threatened to leave Lausanne.82 The Turks were in a state of “dazed
and childish stupidity,” Grew confided in his diary, without the ability to yield or to
make any constructive suggestions.83 The final day of the conference came on
February 4, 1923. Bristol, Child and Grew went to the hall that led to Curzon’s
room where the Allied powers met with Ismet. The hall was packed with diplomats
and journalists. Ismet appeared at the door, “descending the stairs followed by his
delegation; he took off his bowler hat, and bowed right and left to the crowd in the
hall, smiling broadly and left the hotel.”84 The conference was broken without any
prospect for peace.

Chester Concession Revitalized

On April 9, 1923, in between the two meetings of the Lausanne Conference,
the Chester Group received a concession from the Turks in the name of the
Ottoman-American Development Company (OADC).85 The concession included
road and railway buildings, construction of public utilities, creation of a new capital
in Ankara, new harbors in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and development
of oil and mineral resources along the lines of the railroad for 99 years. The
concession included the oil reserves in Mosul as well.86 According to the

82 Ibid, February 3, 1923, ibid, 53.
83 Ibid, February 2, 1923, ibid, 48.
84 Ibid, February 4, 1923, ibid, 56.
85 Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy o f the Dollar: First Era 1919-1932 ( Hamden, Connecticut: Archon
Books, 1965), 55.
86 Ibid, 56.
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concession, the exclusive railway, mineral and oil concessions covered 20
kilometers on either side of a 2,400-mile right-of-way, beginning in Angora and
covering today’s eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq. OADC estimated it would
spend one billion five hundred million dollars for the entire construction project.87
By granting the Chester Concession, the Turks made progress towards their
short and long term objectives. In the short term, the Turkish government wanted
to divide the Allied front by bringing the U.S. to its side. The Turks understood that
the U.S. would not allow Britain to have exclusive rights in Mosul. The Turks
decided that they would rather have political authority over Mosul and let the U.S.
exploit its underground resources than surrender the region entirely to Britain. In
the long run, Turkey needed money and technical assistance to rebuild its
destroyed and bankrupt country. In their dealing with Admiral Bristol, the Turks
showed that they preferred U.S. development and assistance, which would help
the Turks rid themselves of the European imperialism under which they suffered
for centuries.88 The Chester Concession railway system was considered vital by
the Turks for the future defense of the country. In a newspaper interview, Mouhtar
Bey, chief engineer of the Eastern Railways, who was also the first Turkish
Ambassador to the U.S. in 1930, indicated that the railways were essential to his
country’s future 89

87 Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and The Mandates System: A Study o f Economic Equality
Before and Since the Establishment o f the Mandate System (London: George Allen & Unwin
LTD., 1930), 146.
88 Bristol to A.W . Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 131 1923, Bristol Papers, 6.
89 RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions. Folders 26-75
Box 4, Entry 121, Folder: Press, Aksham, April 17, 1923.
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The timing of the concession’s ratification was not a coincidence. Preparing for
the second meeting at Lausanne, the Turkish government planned to make a final
push for its Mosul claim. By granting the Chester Concession to the Americans,
the Turks gambled that this would influence the U.S. to back Turkey in their
struggle to include Mosul in the new republic. Furthermore, the Turks calculated
that even if they could not obtain Mosul, they would use the case to score in other
fields such as getting rid of financial and judicial capitulations. That was why the
Turkish government compelled the members of the National Assembly to attend a
Sunday meeting. In this Grand Assembly session, Rauf Bey, the Prime Minister,
claimed that the Chester Concession would help Turkey militarily and
economically.90 The Assembly easily secured the ratification of the concession by
a large majority.
France immediately protested the Chester Concession.91 On April 16, the
French Ambassador informed the U.S. Department of State that the right to build
certain railroads in Anatolia before the war had been granted to the French in
consideration of a loan to the Turks of a billion francs. France had already loaned
about half the money and had started construction before the war broke out.
While the French supported the Open Door policy, they considered it inconsistent
with that principle for one concession to be annulled and another to be granted in

90 Ibid, Ikdam, April 14, 1923.
91 April 21, from the U.S. Embassy at Paris to the American Mission at Lausanne, File: 24
Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43 Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and
Expositions. International Conference Records U.S. Mission Lausanne Conference Second
Phase Records. General Records, Apr. - Aug. 1923, Folders 17-24 Second Committee. Entry
121 (Hereafter referred to as RG 43).
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its place. He was told that the Department had incomplete information regarding
the Chester Concession.92 Britain also protested the concession on the ground
that Mesopotamia was not under Turkish jurisdiction.93
Now that the French and British were hostile to Chester, Bristol believed that
American prestige required that Chester be given effective support.94 The
Department of State recognized the ratification of the Chester Concession as a
triumph of Open Door policy that would prevent the British from claiming the region
for themselves.95 The Department instructed Joseph Grew, on the day he was to
depart for Lausanne for the second conference, that the U.S. should aggressively
support the Chester Concession at the conference.96

The Second Lausanne Conference

On April 21, 1923, Joseph Grew boarded a train in Bern to return to
Lausanne 97 This time he was hopeful that there would be an end to the Eastern
Question. His optimism came from the fact that the Allied nations had come to
realize that they must recognize the complete sovereignty of the new Turkish
Republic. That was why there was a consensus among them that they were not
going to seek economic and judicial interference in the new republic’s affairs. Grew
Qp

Department of State to the Lausanne Mission, April 2 7 ,1 9 2 3 . RG 43.
93 U.S. Embassy at London to the Mission, M ay 4, 1923, Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Grew, April 21, 1923, unpublished diary, Grew Papers, 73.
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predicted that the main focus of the second meeting at Lausanne was going to be
pre-war concessions.98 Before the conference, the British delegate warned that the
Turks would try to play one party against the other.99 It was too late, however, as
the Turkish National Assembly ratified the Chester Concession two weeks before
the conference, thereby making the U.S. an interested party for the Near Eastern
oil reserves.
Joseph Grew headed the U.S. mission to the conference; both France and
Britain were represented by their respective commissioners in Constantinople,
General Pelle and Horace Rumbold; the Italian delegation was headed by
Montagna, Minister to Athens; and once again the head Turkish negotiator was
Ismet Pasha. The U.S. repeated its strategy from the first conference and joined
the second meeting as observers.100 Grew informed the Allied representatives that
they were ready to cooperate, but did not intend to involve themselves in the
negotiations.101 Because the U.S. objective was to have a fair share of the Near
Eastern oil reserves through the Chester Concessions, Secretary Hughes asked
Grew to eliminate any obstacle at the conference that would endanger the

98

From the American Mission at Lausanne to the U.S. Embassy in London, June 6, 1923: File:
London Embassy, Box 1. RG 43.

99 Grew Papers, Diary 1, 1923, May 1.
100 The State Department to the U.S. Embassy at Berne, April 1 9 ,1 9 2 3 , File: 20 American
Delegation, Box 3. RG 43, 2.
101 From Grew to the Department, April 27, 1923, Lausanne, Folders 26-75 Box 4, RG 43.
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Concessions.102 During the negotiations, the U.S. remained the only power that
rejected the Allied concession requests.103
Turkey’s goal was to terminate the capitulations, remove the Ottoman debts,
and take back Mosul. The Turks broke the negotiations once before and they
would not have hesitated to break it again even, if it resulted in war in order, not to
give any judicial or political rights to foreign nations. Ismet was adamant that
capitulations had been abolished after September 1914 when the Ottoman Empire
had entered the Great War and sent a note to all capitulatory powers that
capitulations were no longer tolerated by the Ottoman Empire.104 Ismet
established that foreigners in the country could continue to live and do business,
but they were bound to the new Turkish laws.105
On April 22, Ismet proposed to Grew that the two countries strengthen their
economic relations, not only by concluding a treaty but also with economic
concessions. After all, the Turks showed their good faith by granting the Chester
Concession. He stated categorically to Grew that no step that he might take at
Lausanne would in any manner prejudice valid U.S. rights.106 Ismet mentioned that
General Pelle planned to bring up the Chester Concession at the conference, and
he asked what the U.S. response Would be. Grew simply indicated that the U.S.
102

From the State Department to the U.S. Embassy at Berne, April 19, Box 3, File: 20 American
Delegation, RG 43, 6.

103 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Departm ent of State, July 7, Box 3, File: 24
Concession 2 of 2, RG 43.
104 From Grew to the Department of State, April 27, 1923: Box 1, File: 9A, 1 of 5, RG 43.
105 From Grew to the Department of State, M ay 1, 1923, ibid.
106 Lausanne, July 8, 1923, RG 43, Box 4.
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always protected its legitimate rights.107 Grew understood that the Turks would
not accept the most-favored nation clause, and would demand reciprocity from
the United States.108 The Turks pointed out that they considered the Treaty of
1830 to be abrogated and that there were no consular conventions drawn up
since the abolition of the capitulations. Therefore, they wanted to negotiate a
separate convention. According to the Turks, all pre-war treaties were
capitulatory; the capitulations were abolished; therefore, the pre-war treaties
were abolished.109
After the conclusion of the first Lausanne Conference, France no longer had
any territorial ambitions in the Near East. The primary French goal was to recover
some of the pre-war investments in the Near East. In that regard, General Pelle
informed Grew that the Chester Concession touched French interests in the
Samsun-Sivas railway on the Black Sea region and the development of the port of
Samsun.110 Pelle further explained that France had negotiated for the SamsunSivas railway with the Ottoman officials in Paris and Constantinople in 1914 and
provided for a French loan of eight hundred million francs for the Ottoman
government.111 These agreements were confirmed by an Imperial law on April 8,
1914. The Ottoman parliament approved it in June and the Parliament passed a

107 Grew, April 22, 1923, Diary, 77.
108 Grew to Bristol, M ay 17, 1923, RG 43, Box 4, Folder 31, 2.
109 Ibid, May 17, 1923, 1, (Separate letter from ibid).
110 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, M ay 29, 1923, File: 24
Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43, 1
111 Ibid.
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law confirming the loan on July 1 4 ,1914.112 France paid an advance of five
hundred million francs and started building the railway. Three weeks later work
stopped due to the outbreak of war between France and Germany.113 In February
1922 Hamid Bey, the representative in Constantinople of the Grand National
Assembly, gave General Pelle assurances that the French pre-war concessions
would be respected. Pelle informed Grew that the French government did not wish
to interfere with the Chester Concession but that it would demand compensation in
some other form.114 Later in the conference, Grew urged Ismet to compensate the
French company; because Grew was involved, Ismet guaranteed compensation to
France.115
The head Italian delegate, Montagna, expressed hope that Italy and the United
States might work together in the Near East. He believed that in contrast to
France, Italy, with an increasing birth-rate and vigorous laboring population, must
have room for expansion. That Italy looked toward infiltration of Asia Minor was no
secret. When Grew told him that beyond equal economic opportunity the U.S. had
no political interest in Turkey, he answered that political influence naturally
followed economic influence and that in 25 years, more or less, when the new
republic finally crumbled, both the U.S. and Italy shall be among those present. He

112 Ibid.
113 Ibid, 2.
114 Ibid.
115 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 6, 1923, File: 24,
Concession (1 of 2), Box 3. RG 43, 5.
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said Italy was politically weak but she was militarily, sociologically and
philosophically strong.
Britain wanted mandates over Mosul and Palestine, as well as a safe
evacuation of Constantinople.116 During the negotiations, the British delegate used
other matters - judicial and economic concessions and war reparations - as
bargaining chips in order to control the oil fields. Early in the conference, the
matter of concessions was taken up in informal conversation between Ismet and
the European Allies. These delegates requested that concessions signed before
August 1, 1914 be confirmed as well as concessions for which the regularization
had begun but not been completed before August 1, 1914.117 This would be a
blow for the Chester Concession as the request would validate the Turkish
Petroleum Company’s claims in the region. Feeling the pressure, Ismet asked
Grew to make presentations on this subject to the Allied delegates.118
Ismet visited Grew on June 6. He complained that the other Allied delegates
were forcing him to sign a treaty confirming pre-war concessions that were not
legally valid.119 He warned Grew that this move was specifically directed against
the Chester Concession and that he might be forced to yield in the interest of
peace. When Ismet asked for Grew’s opinion, Grew said that Turkey had fought

116 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 5, 1923, File: 24
Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43.
117 Grew to Bristol, June 5, 1923, RG 43, 1.
118 Grew to Bristol, M ay 17, 1923, Box 4, Folder 31 RG 43, 1.
119 American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 6, 1923, File: 24, Concession
(1 of 2), p. 1. Box 3. RG 43.
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for its sovereignty and should not yield on such an important question.120 When
Ismet asked about the U.S. response if the Turks should yield, Grew declared that
the U.S. would not accept the principle of legalization of pre-war concessions.121 In
other words, the U.S. was not going to leave Mosul to the British. Receiving the
exact response he sought, Ismet kissed Grew on both cheeks. The Turks now had
the Americans behind them, which would make it more difficult for the British and
French to push the Turks around at the conference.
After long negotiations, the Turks and the British agreed to settle the Mosul
boundary issue within nine months after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. If it
was not settled by then, it would be referred to the League of Nations.122 Grew
proudly informed the State Department that there was not going to be any
mention of the Turkish Petroleum Company nor any prior or future concessions
in the treaty. The U.S. mission successfully eliminated from the treaty all of the
objectionable provisions relating to concessions.123
After Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty with the European Allies, the U.S.
signed a separate treaty with Turkey, which established equal relations between
the two countries. The U.S. achieved its two primary goals at the conference:
preventing Britain from extending its sphere of influence in the Near East and
continuing the Chester Concession. While the U.S.’s 1920’s foreign policy
mentality dictated an aggressive Open Door policy, the Turkish receptiveness
120 ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Grew to the Department of State, June 26, 1923, File: 9A, (1 of 5), Box 1, RG 43.
123 Grew to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, July 18, 1923, File: Paris Embassy, Box 1, RG 43.
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towards American capital in the region was instrumental to accomplishing this
mission. By granting the Chester Concession to the U.S. at just the right time, the
Turks caused tension between the Allies and the U.S. In the end, Britain
recognized in principle American interests in the region. Although the Turks
ultimately failed to assert their control over Mosul, the issue helped them to end
the Allied occupation of Asia Minor and create a fully independent state.
After he replaced Woodrow Wilson and became President in 1921, Warren
Harding reintroduced Open Door and Dollar Diplomacy policies as the foundation
of U.S. foreign policy his administration. This was the driving force behind the U.S.
delegation during the Lausanne negotiations. For the many Americans who
believed in Wilson’s idealism, however, an Open Door policy was tasteless and
contradicted U.S. national values. From its signing until its rejection in the Senate
in early 1927, the American public engaged in an intense dispute regarding the
ratification of the Treaty.
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CHA PTER III

A M ERICAN PU BLIC ’S REACTION TO THE LAUSANNE TR EA TY

With the Lausanne Treaty, the U.S. government agreed for the first time to
have diplomatic relations with a predominantly Muslim nation based on the
principles of equality and reciprocity. Yet a broad cross-section of the American
people considered the Turks to be culturally, religiously and ethnically inferior.
They believed that a treaty with the Turks was pointless because the Turks would
not recognize international rules and regulations. This common perception of the
Turks was based on broadly accepted stereotypes that were reinforced in the
media.1 For example, Turks were routinely depicted as ugly and uncivilized,
particularly the Turkish men who were living a hedonistic life style in their harems
filled with Christian girls. This stereotypical view of the Turks was reinforced by the
news of Turkish atrocities against Armenians during the Great War in 1914 and

1915.2

1 For some Turkish depictions in U.S. media, refer to these cartoons, “Turkey Must Remain in
Europe” Literary Digest, April 3 1920 Vol. 65 No. 1, 25. “The Unspeakable Turk” Literary Digest,
Decem ber 18, 1920 Vol. 67 No. 12, 15. “Uncorked by the W a r” Literary Digest, May 6, 1922 Vol.
73 No. 6, 23. “It Ain’t Polite to Interrupt” Literary Digest, June 17, 1922 Vol. 73 No. 12, 11.
2 The Ottoman Empire’s handling of the Armenian independence movement in Anatolia in 1914
and 1915 is a cause of a serious disagreement between historians who called the event as
“Genocide” and those who claimed that it was a “civil w ar.” There is a consensus among many
European and North American historians that the Ottoman government systematically
exterminated close to one million Armenian civilians. A group of mostly Turkish historians, on the
other hand, claim that what happened was a civil war among Turks, Kurds and Armenians which
resulted in many casualties and death on all sides. During the research at the Manuscript Division
of the Library of Congress in Washington DC, I came across several eye witness accounts that
support the “Genocide” interpretation.
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The Treaty with Turkey was no longer a matter of recognizing a relatively
obscure country, but a matter of protecting American purity and honor by
abstaining from relations with Turkey. It was just as important to assist and protect
Christians under their rule. The opposition to the treaty created an ideological
language that was communicated through race, gender and religious codes. This
ideological language, originated from the Turks’ massacres of the Armenians
during the Great War, strengthened the popular anti-Turkish view that was the
basis for the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty in January 1927. Some opponents
fused these religious and racial arguments with anti-business interests in support
of their moralistic approach to U.S. foreign policy

The Opposition to the Treaty

Opponents of the Treaty founded committees, mobilized churches, and sent
individual petitions to their elected officials and policy makers to try and change
U.S. Open Door policy, as well as to assist and protect the Christian population in
Turkey. The anti-Lausanne discourse galvanized the Democratic Party leadership
ideologically and provided it with a broad-based, popular issue with which to
oppose the Republican administration. The anti- Lausanne movement also
demonstrated the impact of religion, racial prejudice and gender roles in U.S.
foreign policy making. Immediately after its signature, the Lausanne Treaty
became the next chapter in the struggle between Christianity and Islam. This
Crusading mentality was channeled towards inspiring manly Americans to save
innocent Christian women and girls from Turkish savages.
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By sending separate notes to the President, the State Department and
individual Senators immediately after the signing of the Treaty, the Congregational
Ministers of Idaho registered their concerns about potential future massacres of
Christians by Turks.1 The ministers’ petition claimed that Muslim Turks, by
inheritance and religion, were incapable of treating Christians humanely.2 They
pleaded with the U.S. government to apply the “sternest justice for the past and
most rigid restrictions for the future.”3 Another group of Baptist ministers declared
that the U.S. needed to go to war against the infidel Turks in order to save the
Armenians.4
In a petition to U.S. Senators, one hundred and ten Episcopalian bishops, led
by Bishop William Manning of New York, claimed that Christian sentiment in the
U.S. was strongly against such a treaty with an “anti-Christian government” that
killed one million innocent Christian men, women and children, and was holding
tens of thousands of Christian women and children in harems.5 These Bishops
claimed that it was the U.S.’s moral obligation to help Christian Armenians.6

1 From Idaho Congregational Conference to Borah, March 10, 1920. Boise, Idaho. Box 83, File:
1919-20 Foreign Affairs, William Borah Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington D C ) hereafter, Borah Papers.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Thomas A. Bailey, The M an in the Street: The Impact o f American Public Opinion on Foreign
Policy (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1964), 203.
5 A Protest to the Honorable Claude A. Swanson: Against Ratification by the Senate o f the
Lausanne Treaty Negotiated Between the United States and Turkey at Lausanne on August 6,
1923, by One Hundred and Ten Bishops. Publication time and place is unknown, however, it
appears that this pamphlet was published some time during the second half of 1926. Found at
Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39. Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington DC, 1.
6 Ibid, 2.
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Bishops from the Northern Baptist Church, Methodist Episcopal Church
South, Reformed Church, and Episcopalian Church denounced the treaty in a
letter to the Senate immediately preceding the vote on the Treaty. These bishops
wrote that the Treaty ignored the U.S.’s moral obligations towards Armenians
and broke Wilson’s promise to give them an independent homeland. They
argued that the treaty condoned massacres of Armenians and abandoned
“untold thousands of Christian girls now in Moslem hands to their fate.” According
to these bishops, only big businesses supported the treaty. The letter concluded
that the Treaty would be a dishonor to the U.S. and Christian churches.7
In addition to organized church opposition, there were other committees
established against the Treaty. One of them was the American Committee for the
Independence of Armenia (ACIA). According to the ACIA, the Turks made an
alliance with the U.S. State Department in return for their support of an Open Door
policy in the Near East.8 The ACIA described it as “dishonorable” that the Chester
Concessions determined the U.S. government’s position at Lausanne.9 In an ACIA
pamphlet, the Turks were portrayed as the “most primitive and backward branch
of the Mongolian race.”10 Turks were also characterized as a mixture of races,

7 January 8, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, P G .1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69, Sess.2,
microfilm No. 174, 1266.
8 “Kemalist Turkey,” in The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, New York, 1924, 48. Found at
Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.
9 “The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey,” by American Committee for the Independence of
Armenia, New York: 1924, ibid, 13.
10 Charles H. Kirby, “The Turks,” ibid, 48.
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including black slaves of Sudan and Central Africa, and as a result they
represented a “lower type” of people.11
A member of the ACIA, James W. Gerard, former U.S. Ambassador to
Germany, accused Secretary Hughes of lying about the connection between U.S.
policy at the Lausanne Conference and the Chester Concession.12 Gerard also
accused Hughes of changing his opinion about Armenians after he became the
Secretary of State. He accurately noted that Hughes supported Armenian
independence in 1919.13 He also pointed out that Turkish and American
representatives at Lausanne worked together to abolish capitulations and resolve
the Armenian issue in Turkey’s favor. In return, the Turks accepted the U.S. Open
Door policy as the basis for foreign relations.14 In the Chester Concession case,
Gerard accused the Department of State of reverting “to the old and discredited
policy of Dollar Diplomacy.”15 He concluded that American honor depended upon
keeping its promise for an independent Armenia.16
Historian Merlo Pusey, biographer of Charles Hughes, wrote that Hughes had
been an active member of the Armenian Committee for the Independence of
Armenia before he became the Secretary of State. Early in 1919 Hughes
advocated for American protection of Armenians. Turkish atrocities against this

11 Ibid, 48-49.
12 James W . Gerard, “A Scandalous Treaty,” ibid, 13.
13 Ibid, 14.
14 Ibid, 16-17.
15 Ibid, 17.
16 Ibid.
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Christian minority during the war aroused U.S. public opinion, and Hughes at the
time supported U.S. intervention on Armenia’s behalf while the troops were
already in Europe.17 Once he became Secretary of State, however, Hughes
believed that the possibility of intervention no longer existed. He concluded that
most of the U.S. troops had left Europe, the Turks were prepared to fight to protect
their territorial integrity, and the U.S. public would never support sending soldiers
to die in Turkey. Pusey explained that when the Lausanne Conference opened,
Hughes’ inability to protect the rights of the persecuted and decimated Armenians
in Turkey left him in an embarrassing position. Pusey claimed that the antiLausanne people never forgave Hughes for abandoning the Armenians’ fate to the
Turks.18
Another domestic committee active in this debate was the American
Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT). In one of their 1926
publications, ACOLT asserted that the Treaty was against “the spirit of Christianity”
as well as “the ideals of America.”19 According to ACOLT, the treaty defied
Wilson’s promise for an independent Armenia. ACOLT claimed that the Treaty was
an approval of a government “founded upon murder, rape and rapine;” it sullied
American honor; undermined U.S. obligation to Armenia; was “un-American” and

17 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. II (N ew York: The Macmillan Company, 1951),
574.
18 Ibid.
19

The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, based in N ew York. Publication
place and date is unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published in N ew York City
some time during the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers,
Reel No: 33 of 41, Conts. 40-41.
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un-Christian.”20 According to Ernest Riggs, an ACOLT member and previous
missionary in Asia Minor, Wilson’s acceptance of an Armenian homeland agitated
the Turks, increased their hostility, and contributed to Turkish violence against the
Armenians directly. This explains why the U.S. had a moral obligation to protect
the Armenians 21
Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. (1856-1946) was a leader in the opposition
movement. As an admirer of Woodrow Wilson, Morgenthau was a strong believer
in American moral superiority over other nations. This superiority, according to
him, brought moral responsibilities.22 He believed that most of the nations of the
world were immoral, but the U.S. was unique and should therefore demonstrate
that it was an ethical and peaceful nation through its policies and actions. Then,
the U.S. can “sit in judgment upon international disputes” and resolve international
conflicts fairly.23 One of the responsibilities of the U.S., he asserted, was to deal
with the Turks. During his tenure as Ambassador in the Ottoman Empire during
World War I, Morgenthau Sr. witnessed the extermination of Armenians. When the
U.S. entered the Great War, he returned to the U.S. and became an ardent
advocate of an Armenian state.

20 Ibid, 5.
21 The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, based in New York, “A Missionary
on the Lausanne Treaty,” signed by Ernest W . Riggs (March 1926), ibid.
22 Henry Morgenthau, “A m erica’s Moral Responsibility to the World”Speech at the Church of
Covenant in the Washington DC in November, 1921. The Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel 20-41,
Conts. 23-24, 9.
23 Ibid.
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The greatest opponent of the Treaty in the Senate was William King, a
Democrat from Utah. According to King, the Lausanne Treaty was opposed by
Democratic senators upon these grounds: “It failed to provide for the fulfillment of
the Wilson award to Armenia, guaranteeing protection of Christians and nonMoslems in Turkey, and recognition by Turkey of American nationality of former
subjects of Turkey... American commerce with Turkey-actual and potential - is a
trifling matter of but a few millions of dollars annually and needs no serious
consideration.”24 After traveling in Turkey and Russia in 1925, King concluded that
the U.S. should recognize the Bolsheviks before the Turks.25
King additionally drafted legislation to bring this issue before the Senate. In
June 3, 1924, for example, he introduced a resolution that charged the Treaty with
betraying the Armenians. The Resolution also invited the Senate to investigate the
relationship between the Chester Concession and the Treaty 26 A month before
the Senate vote, King introduced another resolution reminding his colleagues of
Wilson’s promise to the Armenians and highlighting the relationship between the
Open Door policy and the Chester Concessions.27 King correctly perceived that

24 W hy the Democrats Defeated the Turkish Treaty, The Literary Digest for January 29, 1927. Box
91, Notebook-News Clippings, Bristol Papers, 10.
25 The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, based in New York, “Senator
King’s Reply,” signed by William H. King (March 9, 1926), 14. Publication place and date is
unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published in New York City some time during
the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 33 of 41,
Conts. 40-41. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
26 Congressional Record Vol. 65, PT.10-11, PG .9583-11,367, 1924 Cong.68, Sess. 1, microfilm
No. 166, 10292.
27 Res. 306. Decem ber 22, 1926, Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, P G .1-3482, 1926-27
Cong.69, Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 910-911.

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Turks granted the Chester Concessions in order to secure the moral and
diplomatic support of the U.S. delegation in Lausanne.28
The Lausanne Treaty had its outspoken detractors in the most prestigious
universities. Even among scholars, racist and bigoted language was employed to
defeat the treaty. Albert Bushnell Hart, Professor of government at Harvard
University, was wrote many articles condemning U.S. foreign policy in the Near
East and criticizing the Treaty. Hart claimed that the U.S. government ignored
public opinion when negotiating the Treaty.29 According to Hart, the Treaty
assumed that the Turks were a civilized people who would honor their promises.
Hart claimed that the Turks were of Asiatic stock and had been a “dreadful curse”
to Europe for six hundred years.30 As a barbaric nation, they first destroyed the
Byzantium Empire and enslaved Christians who were “superior to them in culture.”
He characterized the Turks as far more alien to the European culture than the
Chinese and Japanese people.31 Hart believed that the Turks were incapable of
excelling in literature or business; they knew only how to fight.32
Hart conceded that the educated Turk was “delightful” and loved “dogs,
children and wives and flowers and nature; but at heart he is still a Mongol

28 Ibid, 911.
29

Albert Bushnell Hart, “Dead Against the Turkish Treaty,” in The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist
Turkey, New York, 1924, p. 5. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts.
38-39.

30 Ibid, 6.
31 Ibid, 7.
32 Ibid.
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Tartar.”33 He wondered: if the Negroes in the U.S. revolted, seized power, and
reduced the white race into bondage, would other nations make treaties with this
new country?34 He claimed that as long as the Turks controlled the western side of
the Bosporus, there could not be a treaty as they were an unreliable nation that
could not be trusted to protect their Christian population35 He explained that
Britain and France signed treaties with Turkey because they had financial interests
in the region, but that the American people were opposed to this type of
commercial diplomacy.36
Hart believed that as an Asiatic race the Turks were unfit to be a civilized
nation and that was why the U.S. should not associate with them.37 Exhibiting a
complete disregard to the realities of African Americans in the U.S., he further
claimed that the new Turkish regime was racist because of their treatment of the
minorities and he labeled them the Ku Klux Klan of the Near East.38 According to
Hart, President Wilson did not recognize the Huerta government that was “founded
upon force” in Mexico; he then asked why the U.S. should have relations with the
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Albert Bushnell Hart, “Dead Against the Turkish Treaty,” 11.
34 Ibid.
35 Albert Bushnell Hart, “Making Friends with Unrighteousness,” Forum, Decem ber 1924, Vol.
LXXII, No. 6, p. 735.
36 Ibid.
37 Albert Bushnell Hart, “Reservations as to the Eastern Question,” Annals o f the Academics of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 108, America’s Relations to the European Situation (July 923),

120 .
38 Ibid, 122.

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Turks “who are below the level of Mexicans in moral fiber and no higher in selfgovernment?”39
An influential publication at this time was Kemal’s Slave Market and the
Lausanne Treaty.40 According to this document, there were between 100,000 400,000 Christian girls in Turkish harems. Christian girls of 14 years of age were
taken into Turkish harems and younger girls were “farmed out to Arabs and
Kurds” until they grew up.41 It also indicated that thousands of women killed
themselves rather than marry Moslem men, causing a disgrace to Christianity.
This piece stated that the
multitude of white Christian women, girls and children, [were] helpless in
the hands of Moslem owners-unable to escape from Moslem bondagesubject to foul indignity and bestial brutality. We think of young white
children who are being farmed until they reach the age of 14 who are for
sale. We think of the appalling fact that the Anglo Saxon race of Britain
and America stands by and sees these things. We think of girls as
educated and refined as any that can be found in Britain or America
forced to be wives of Moslems - forced oftentimes by beating and
threats of death to repeat the Moslem formula before the Mullah.
Christian girls are waiting to be rescued.42
Other opponents to the Treaty included A.D.F. Hamlin, Dean of the School of
Architecture at Columbia University, who postulated that the U.S. signed the
Treaty because the U.S. was too cowardly to consider an armed conflict with the
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Albert Bushnell Hart. “Making Friends with Unrighteousness,” 738.

40 Publisher and publication time is unknown. This document is available at The Papers of Henry
Morgenthau Sr. Conts. 40-41, Reel No. 33 of 41.
41 K em al’s Slave M arket and the Lausanne Treaty, The Papers of Henry Morgenthau Sr. Conts.
40-41, Reel No. 33 of 41, 2.
42 Ibid, 7-8.
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Turks.43 He characterized the Lausanne Treaty as a sign of “infamy, a piece of
national cowardice, and a symptom of moral bankruptcy.”44 Oscar Solomon Straus
objected to the Lausanne Treaty because it abolished the capitulations and
entangled the U.S. in European affairs 45 Straus was convinced Turks were not
civilized enough to have a Western type of judicial system, and that placing
Americans under Turkish rule was dangerous.46 Wilfred M. Post, who worked in
Turkey as a medical missionary for 21 years, criticized the Treaty in his 1926
pamphlet47 that claimed the U.S. government placed American institutions in
Turkey under Turkish law with the abandonment of capitulations 48 Wilfred
reminded readers that this was the government that murdered thousands of
Armenians and destroyed Smyrna.49 He concluded that the Treaty was “one sided,
unsatisfactory, humiliating and dishonorable.”50 James Paulos, a chocolate shop
owner from Minnesota, on behalf of seven hundred thousand Greek citizens of the
U.S., ten thousand Greek citizens of Montana and seven thousand Greek ex
43 A.D.F. Hamlin, “A Treaty of Surrender,” in The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, New
York, 1924, p. 31. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.
44 Ibid.
45 Oscar Solomon Straus, “Objections to the Lausanne Treaty,” in The Lausanne Treaty and
Kemalist Turkey, New York, 1924, p. 46. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of
41, Conts. 38-39. Although he did not explain why the Treaty would cause an entanglement in
European affairs, the Chester Concession would have been the major reason of his belief.
46 Ibid, 47.
47 Wilfred M. Post, “An Indefensible and Humiliating Treaty” Publication place and date is
unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published some time during the second half of
1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 33 of 41, Conts. 40-41.
48 Ibid, 2.
49 Ibid, 13.
50 Ibid, 15.
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servicemen who served during the war urged Senator Thomas Walsh, member of
the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, to reject the treaty.51
Some evoked the Crusades to advocate for military intervention. On July 24,
1922, Hughes informed Harding of his conversation with Bishop Cannon of the
Methodist Church. The Methodist Church adopted a resolution that said the U.S.
government should take all necessary steps to help the Christians in Turkey,
including sending soldiers. 52 The Reverend Alfred Harding of the Protestant
Episcopalian Church of Washington sent a note to Hughes and requested that
the U.S. make every effort — diplomatic, naval or military — that would help the
Christians.53
For some Americans the Lausanne Treaty symbolized an Islamic victory over
Christianity, and their editorials and public rhetoric drew upon the Crusades
metaphor to fuel public resentment and incite action. A few days before the Senate
vote in early 1927, the New York Times editorialized that the rejection of the Treaty
would be akin to the Battle of Tours between the Frankish Army and the AlAndalus Empire of Spain in 732 A.D. According to the editorial, just as the Battle
Tours closed the doors of Europe to the spread of Islam, the rejection of the Treaty
would represent another Christian victory over Islam.54 The editor emphasized that

51 James P. Paulson to Thomas J. Walsh, October 8, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E.
Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.
52 Hughes to President Harding, July 24, 1922. FR US 1922, Vol. 2, United States Government
Printing Office: Washington, 1938, 931.
53 Bishop Alfred Harding to Hughes, Septem ber 22, 1922. FRUS 1922, Vol. 2, United States
Government Printing Office: Washington, 1938, 938.
54 New York Times, January 15 1927, “Hammering Islam,” 14.
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under the pending Treaty, Turks could come to the U.S. to convert Christians and
Jews to Islam.55 The writer warned the readers that if the Treaty was ratified, the
call of the muezzin would be heard from the roofs of synagogues and churches.
Before the vote on the Treaty, Duncan Upshaw Fletcher (1859-1936),
Democratic Senator from Florida, made a dramatic speech on the floor of the
Senate that implored the members to vote against the Treaty. Fletcher began by
saying that it was an insult to the honor and values of the U.S. to ratify the Treaty
because it would legitimize a thousand years of Turkish barbarism. Fletcher
characterized the Treaty as condoning wholesale murder, rape, pillage and every
other kind of shameless infamy of the Turks. He exclaimed that for hundreds of
years it was Christendom’s goal to drive back the barbarian hordes of Turkey out
of Europe and put an end to their rule over Christians. He continued that Turkish
brutality was sustained through the Great War and their independence war, and
Treaty supporters asked the U.S. to condone acts of outrage and violence
against white Christian women. Upshaw also connected the Treaty to Dollar
Diplomacy and big businesses’ voracious and unchecked grab for power,
resources and money, “which left out all morality in foreign policy.” He accused
the industrialists of uniting U.S. interests with the evil, infamous Turks. Big
business, he warned, wanted the U.S. to ratify the Treaty while thousands of
Christian girls remained enslaved in Turkish harems.56

55 Ibid.
56 January 18, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, P G .1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69,
Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 1881.
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Support for the Ratification

The opposition was wide-spread and prevented the Senate from achieving
support in sufficient numbers to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. There were, however,
outspoken advocates of establishing relations with Turkey in religious and
education institutions. The Congregational Churches of the U.S. and its foreign
missionary society, The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions,
were strong supporters of the treaty. On April 12, 1926 the Commission on Foreign
Relations of the National Council of the Congregational Churches unanimously
decided to support the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.57 Less than a month
before the ratification came to the Senate floor, the Congregational Church sent
separate letters to Frank Kellogg, the new Secretary of State, William Borah, the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and President
Coolidge.58 In these letters, the Congregational Church argued that the Lausanne
Treaty would actually protect the American missionary, educational and
philanthropic interests in Turkey that were over a century old. The letter further
explained that Armenians would have the fullest protection only with the Treaty
and the subsequent official presence of the American government through an
embassy.
The First Congregational Church actively sought the support of the policy
makers to ratify the Treaty. In a June 1926 letter to Senator Thomas Walsh, the

57 The National Council of the Congregational Churches to Thomas J. Walsh, Decem ber 20,
1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.
58 The National Council of the Congregational Churches to Thomas J. Walsh, Decem ber 20,
1926, ibid.
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Church explained that they had invested millions of dollars in Turkey and they had
a substantial number of missionaries and teachers in the field.59 The letter assured
Walsh that the treaty should be ratified for both the well-being of the American
interests in Turkey and the development of this new state.60
Charles Henry Brent (1862-1929), Episcopal bishop of Western New York, was
one of the most prominent religious leaders who at first opposed the Treaty, but
later changed his mind and supported it. He was originally a member of the one
hundred and ten Bishops who opposed the Treaty and an executive committee
member of The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT).
Bishop Brent was also a contributor to anti-Treaty publications.61 Over the course
of a few years, however, he gradually changed his position and became a
supporter of the Treaty.
In September 1926 Brent explained why he retracted his opposition. In a letter
to Secretary Kellogg, Brent wrote that he wanted to dissociate himself from the
extremely prejudiced, inconsistent, and inaccurate statements about Mustapha
Kemal and the 100,000 women said to be in Turkish harems. He knew that the
accusations in the Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty were untrue 62 He

59 The First Congregational Church to Thomas J. Walsh, June 8, 1926, ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 In The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, New York, 1924. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr.
Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39, 12.
62 Bishop Brent’s Answer to the Editorial Entitled “As Seen by Two Bishops” in “The Living
Church” of August 14, 1926., Septem ber 3, 1926. Box 30, File: Prayer Notes Etc, personal copy,
Charles Brent Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 2.
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stated, “It is easier to be consistent than honest.”63 He meant that maintaining the
same opinion would have been the path of least resistance, but it would have been
dishonest when his thoughtfulness and intellectual inquiry had taken him down a
different road. Brent was also influenced by a list of over one hundred Americans
in Constantinople urging Kellogg to ratify the Treaty. The signers represented
every type of American activities in Turkey, including colleges, schools, and
missionary and philanthropic organizations.64
Brent clarified his point further by drawing a domestic parallel, stating that the
U.S. was guilty of the crime of lynching, yet Congress refused to pass an antilynching bill, “so that this nation stands before God and the world as guilty as hell
of every lynching that happens.”65 He pointed out that Americans condemned the
Turks for their history, but wondered what Americans would think if other nations
would refuse a treaty with the U.S. because of its dishonorable history of slavery
and continued treatment of Blacks.66 Brent confessed that ever since he read
John Jay Chapman’s (1862 - 1933) accusation that every American citizen was
guilty of lynching, he felt pain in his soul whenever he heard about a lynching
case.67 While the U.S. was condemning the Turks for barbarous behavior, Brent
preached that the Americans knew lynching was against “the law of God,” but
63 Ibid, 3.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, 10.
66 Ibid, 11.
67 In 1912, Chapman held a memorial service for a lynched black Pennsylvania man on the first
anniversary. His dramatic speech in the service appeared in Harper's W eekly (Septem ber 21,
1912). In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved March 2, 2007, from Encyclopaedia Britannica
Online: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9022484.
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refused to condemn this horrendous crime. He asked the American public what
they would say if a foreign country refused to ratify a treaty, because Americans
practiced and condoned the lynching of its own people, failing to protect the
rights and lives of their own minority population.68
Just as there were Ivy League academics opposed to the Lausanne Treaty,
there were also advocates in favor of its ratification. Edward Meade Earle of
Columbia University claimed that the ratification of the treaty would be simply
recognition of a fait accompli. Like Bishop Brent, he reminded Americans that
Americans should not apply different standards to other nations than what they
apply to themselves.69 In an article that he published in Forum, he pointed out that
the U.S. criticized Turkey for ill-treatment of its minorities. Earle then asked his
readers to consider the Negroes who did not enjoy any protection from courts in
the south, and to remember the judicial injustice against the Japanese on the
Pacific Coast.70 He concluded by claiming that the Turks were no better or worse
than other nations of the Near East, and the U.S. could not continue persisting with
moralistic judgments and dictating terms to other sovereign nations that it labeled
as criminal.71 Earle asserted that the U.S. needed to accept the present terms of
the Treaty because it did nothing between 1917 and 1923 that could have laid the
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Bishop Brent’s Answer to the Editorial Entitled “As Seen by Two Bishops” in “The Living
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Brent Papers, 11.
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70 Ibid, 741.
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foundation for a different and more satisfactory treaty than Lausanne.72 He claimed
that during this time period the U.S. never declared war on Turkey; President
Wilson approved the landing of Greek army in Asia Minor; the U.S. did not
participate in the making of the Sevres Treaty; and finally the U.S. Senate did not
accept a mandate over Armenia in 1920.73
There were other scholars who supported the Treaty. For example, the
president of Mount Holyoke College, Mary E. Woolley, urged Senator Thomas
Walsh to ratify the treaty.74 The rejection, according to her, would cause Turkish
hostility to American educational and religious institutions in Turkey.75 Paul D.
Moodey, the president of Middlebury College, also was one of the supporters of
the treaty. In his letter to Thomas Walsh, he mentioned that people who lived in
the Near East and knew the conditions supported the treaty.76 He asserted that
the reaction against the treaty generated “more heat than light” and urged Walsh
to vote favorably for the treaty.77 Finally, the business interests appealed to policy
makers for the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. The Brooklyn Chamber of
Commerce, for instance, in a letter to Thomas J. Walsh explained that American
72 Edward M eade Earle, the speech at the 68th Luncheon Meeting of the Foreign Policy
Association, Astor Place, N ew York. The transcript of the meeting was published as The
Lausanne Treaty: Should the United States Ratify it?, Foreign Policy Association Pamphlets, No.
26: Series of 1923-24: N ew York, 1924, 8.
73 Ibid, 8-9.
74 Mary E. Woolley to Thomas J. Walsh, Decem ber 4, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E.
Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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trade with Turkey and the Near East was handicapped because there was not a
treaty specifying relations between the U.S. and Turkey.78

The Lausanne Treaty Survives

Although the majority voted for it 54-30, the Senate did not have the two-thirds
majority required to ratify the Treaty. Afterwards, the strong anti-Turkish
movement gradually lost momentum due to the American people’s weariness of
international affairs and their desire to address the ills of their own society rather
than criticizing the Turks. Ironically, the ideological platform based on race and
religion became a major factor in the Coolidge administration’s ability to
reestablish the Lausanne Treaty. During the winter of 1926 when the opposition
was at its peak, some opponents of the Treaty began to realize that the antiTreaty movement devolved into mostly propaganda and was no longer a debate
about U.S. policy.
Some of the previously adamant opponents switched sides to support the
Treaty and turned the arrows of criticism onto social injustice issues in American
society. This explains why the movement lacked the ability to mobilize again
when President Coolidge disregarded the Senate’s decision and activated the
Treaty with the Turks in February 1927. By sending Mark Bristol to Angora, the
U.S. de facto recognized the Turkish nationalist government and agreed to work
with them by the terms agreed to in Lausanne. In the end, both the U.S. and
Turkey lost a valuable opportunity to improve their policies. An impartial criticism

78 Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce to Thom as J. Walsh, Decem ber 30, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh
and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.
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of the Lausanne Treaty may have launched a reasoned debate on U.S. values in
its foreign policy. It may also have pushed the new Turkish Republic to be more
considerate with its minority rights, as a way to lessen U.S. concerns.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. negotiated the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which established equal
diplomatic relations between the two countries on the basis of the Open Door
policy. The U.S. policy makers’ main objective during the Lausanne Conference
was to protect the recent privately-received Chester Concessions. The Chester
Concessions exemplified the increasing significance of Near Eastern underground
resources to big businesses and policy makers in industrialized countries. The
Turkish National Assembly confirmed the Chester Concessions shortly before the
assembly of the second Lausanne Conference'in April 1923 in order to pave the
way for U.S. support of Turkish claims against Britain and France during the
conference. Although this calculated move did not place Mosul within Turkish
borders — one of Turkey’s expressed objectives — the U.S. support of the Turks
against British and French pressure fulfilled another Turkish interest of breaking
Western European imperial claims on Turkish sovereign territory. It can be
postulated that the Turks successfully manipulated the U.S., using Open Door
policy, to prevent Britain and France from imposing what would have been a
disadvantageous treaty from the Turkish perspective.
The Lausanne Treaty, however, met with an unexpected reaction by the
American public. Many Americans from different segments of the society found the
Treaty intolerable and humiliating. Two factors contributed to this reaction: the
Armenian situation and the preconceived prejudices against Muslims and Turks.
During the Great War, the Ottoman Empire, predecessor of the Turkish Republic,
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violently suppressed the independence movement of its Armenian subjects by
systematically exterminating a large portion of their population. The news of this
event circulated in the U.S. media and caused President Wilson to promise an
establishment of an Armenian homeland after the Great War. Turks, on the other
hand, successfully fought a war against the victorious Allies and declared their
independence. This realistically ended any possibility of establishing an Armenian
country in Asia Minor. When the U.S. government signed the Lausanne Treaty,
many Americans perceived the Treaty as abandoning previous U.S. international
obligations towards Armenians.
The second issue that strengthened opposition to the Treaty was racial and
religious prejudice against the Muslims and Turks. Some Americans opposed the
treaty simply because it put the U.S. on equal terms with a predominantly Muslim
country. The perception of the Turks and Muslims extended the historical memory
of the Christian-Muslim struggle from the Battle of Tours in 782 A.D. The
opposition of many Americans to the Treaty did not allow the Senate to produce
the two-thirds of the vote to ratify the Treaty and establish equal relations with
Turkey in January 1927. The Armenian situation and the racial and religious
prejudice created a common ground for the opponents of the Treaty to transmit
opinion among many segments of American society. The Lausanne Treaty,
however, ultimately survived because the Coolidge administration decided that it
was in its best interest to implement the terms of the Treaty regardless of the vote
in the Senate. It also understood that the opposition movement had lost its
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strength and momentum. There was no political will to fight the Treaty again, and
therefore little possibility of a public backlash.
This thesis employed four distinguished historians’ theories to help explain the
origins of the relations between the U.S. and the Turkish Republic between 1923
and 1927. Although all four theories help to understand different aspects of the
relationship, no one can provide a singular intellectual framework when we study
the entire sequence of events during this four year period. Walter LaFeber’s “Open
Door and Empire” theory describes the fagade of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S.
policy makers principally sought free opportunity for all powers in the Near East.
When the opportunity presented itself, like the Chester Concession, however, it did
not hesitate to engage in an imperial struggle with Britain. LaFeber’s theory, with
its disregard for the public’s impact on U.S. foreign policy making, does not
sufficiently explain why the Lausanne Treaty was rejected.
Matthew Connolly’s “small power politics” helped to explain the Turkish
strategy during the Lausanne Conference. The new Turkish Republic’s policy
makers appreciated that the wealth of the Near East had the potential to divide the
U.S. from the European Allies. That was why the Turks supported the U.S. Open
Door policy and granted the Chester Concessions to the Americans. This enabled
the Turks to have the U.S. on their side during the Lausanne Conference.
Although the Turks could not regain Mosul, the U.S. support strengthened their
bargaining power in other areas. It was perhaps due to U.S. support that the Turks
were able to completely reverse the Sevres Treaty, which had put an end to the
Ottoman Empire. Connelly rightly claimed that small powers take advantage of the
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big power politics and are able to exert some influence on larger powers’ policy
making process. This theory also has its limits. Much as the Turks tried, they could
not cause the U.S. to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. Although the Turks gained the
support of the U.S. government at the Conference, the public turned against the
Treaty. Since the Turks did not have any incentives to offer the American people,
they could not ensure its ratification. The Turkish case suggests that Connelly’s
theory is not sufficient to explain the chain of events after the signing of the Treaty.
Michael Hunt’s “ideology” theory fills the gap which LaFeber and Connelly left
in their disregard for cultural norms, historical memory, and prejudices and their
impact on foreign policy making. Hunt’s description of ideology as a common
language that transmits peoples’ ideas to policy makers is vital to understanding
why and how the Lausanne Treaty was rejected. Between the signing of the
Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and the Senate’s rejection of it in 1927, the public debate
provided the Democratic Party policy makers with an ideological framework and
thus legitimized their opposition in the Senate. Hunt’s theory, however, does not
offer any insight or explanation when examining the Lausanne Conference
negotiations, the Turks’ attitude, and the U.S. Open Door policy. Furthermore, the
“ideology” theory is not equipped to explain President Coolidge’s reactivation of the
Treaty right after the Senate vetoed it.
Kristin Hoganson introduced the impact of gender relations and boisterous
character on U.S. foreign policy making. The impact of the news of the Armenian
Genocide and the propaganda around the myth of Turks keeping “white Christian
girls” in their harems affected a large segment of the public to support acting manly
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and save unprotected Christian girls. Although Hoganson’s theory helps us to
understand the path to reject the treaty, like Hunt’s, it is limited and does not
concern itself with the Open Door policy and the Turks’ ability to influence events
and their outcome.
If just one theory could explain the origins of the Turkish-American relations
between 1923 and 1927, there would not have been a need to examine this
historical period. Theories provide a framework to conduct research and analyze
the results. The possibility of coming up with a simple explanation for the origins of
U.S. policy towards Turkey and the hope of creating a new single theory became a
naive dream. The theories of LaFeber, Connelly, Hunt, and Hoganson were
important to deconstructing individual incidences and issues. When these theories
were applied to a sequence of events, however, none of them were sufficient to
understanding this time frame in its entirety.
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